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EQUITY'S LEADED FEET IN A CONTEST OF
SCOUNDRELS: THE ASSERTION OF THE INPARI
DELICTO DEFENSE AGAINST A LAWBREAKING
PLAINTIFF AND INNOCENT SUCCESSORS

*

Brian A. Blum

I.

INTRODUCTION

"While a court of equity will on swift wings fly to relieve the
innocent from wrong or injury, it travels with leadedfeet and turns a
deaf ear, when called on to furnish a cloak of righteousness to cover

sin... ."
"We do not ... lend our aid to the furtherance of an unlawful
project, nor do we decide, as between two scoundrels, who cheated
whom the more. "2
It is a broad and well-established principle of common law that a
court will not entertain a claim by a wrongdoer arising out of the
claimant's own illegal conduct.3 This principle is applicable in any case
* Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School. I thank David Fauria, Soojeong Ji, Diane
Lenkowsky, Darlene Pasienczny, and Brandon Thornburg for research assistance; Samir Parikh and
Amy Bushaw for reviewing and commenting on this Article; and, participants in the Lewis & Clark
Faculty Colloquium for their insights and suggestions during the presentation of an earlier draft of
this Article.
1. Grant v. Grant, 286 S.W. 647, 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
2. Manning v. Noa, 76 N.W.2d 75, 77 (Mich. 1956).
3. Courts and commentators sometimes state this principle as applying to conduct that is
illegal or against public policy. See, e.g., Price v. Purdue Pharma Co., 920 So. 2d 479, 484 (Miss.
2006); Vincent R. Johnson, The Unlawful Conduct Defense in Legal Malpractice, 77 UKMC L.
REv. 43, 58-59 (2008). The reference to public policy is misleading. Although public policy and the
public interest are important considerations in the decision on whether to refuse enforcement of a
claim based on illegal conduct, the underlying problem is that the conduct is illegal, not merely that
the remedy should be denied purely on public policy grounds. The analysis of a transaction (or an
aspect of a transaction) that is legal but violates public policy is different. For example, an
overbroad liability limitation or noncompetition clause in a contract may offend public policy, but it
does not arise from an illegal transaction-it is not illegal to include such a clause in the contract.
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in which a person seeking a legal or equitable remedy violated the law in
the transaction or situation from which the claim arises. The principle is
expressed in two well-worn maxims: ex dolo malo non oritur actio-no
action arises out of one's own fraud or wrongdoing-and ex turpi causa
non oritur actio-no action arises out of an immoral act.4 It is also
reflected in the wrongful conduct rule of tort law and emerges in the
equitable unclean hands doctrine.' (For the sake of brevity, this general
principle is referred to in the rest of this article as the "ex turpi causa
principle.") In its absolute, unqualified form, the ex turpi causaprinciple
calls on a court to turn its back on a guilty claimant and refuse to
countenance the claim at all.6
Where the illegal conduct has been committed by the plaintiffY
alone and the defendant had no role in breaking the law the decision to
refuse relief is relatively uncomplicated. A court will seldom have
qualms about refusing to assist a wrongdoing plaintiff in enforcing any
rights that she might otherwise have had against a defendant who was
uninvolved in the misconduct.' However, in the usual case in which the
ex turpi causa principle is invoked, the defendant was in some way
complicit in the illegal activity.' In the worst case, this complicity may
be deliberate and knowing involvement (where the defendant was an
Therefore, the determination of whether to enforce the contract or offending clause does not involve
the principles of ex turpi causa and in pari delicto that are the subject of this Article. See infra
Part 1IIB.
4.

See John W.

Wade, Benefits Obtained Under Illegal Transactions-Reasons for

and Against Allowing Restitution, 25 TEX. L. REv. 31, 44-46 (1947) (describing the maxims and
their application).
5. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 49-51, 58-62 (discussing the statutory and common law
bases for the wrongful conduct rule of tort law); William J. Lawrence, I, Note, The Application of
the Clean Hands Doctrine in DamageActions, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 673, 674 (1982) ("The clean
hands doctrine demands that a plaintiff seeking equitable relief come into court having acted
equitably in that matter for which he seeks remedy.").
6. Greenwald v. Van Handel, 88 A.3d 467, 472 (Conn. 2014) (stating ex turpi causa is a
universal principle, dictated by public policy, that no one should be permitted to profit from his own
wrong). Sometimes, particularly in older cases, courts express their disapprobation of the plaintiff
with some flair. See, e.g., Grant, 286 S.W. at 650; Collins v. Blantern (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 847,
852; 2 Wils. K.B. 342, 350 ("[N]o polluted hand shall touch the pure fountains ofjustice.... [Y]ou
shall not have a right of action when you come into a court of justice in this unclean manner to
recover it back.").
7. The party asserting the claim based on the illegal transaction or interaction is invariably
the plaintiff in litigation and is referred to as such in this Article. The person against whom the
claim is asserted is, of course, the defendant in the suit.
8. See, e.g., BDO Seidman, LLP v. Harris, 885 N.E.2d 470, 475-76 (Ill. App. 2008) (barring
an accounting firm that incurred significant liability to victims of its client for enabling its client's
misappropriation of trust funds and evasion of taxes from claiming reimbursement from its
professional liability insurer on the grounds that it was a principal participant in the illegal activity).
9. See infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
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instigator or collaborator), but it might also be passive acquiescence
(where the defendant enabled the conduct), or negligent dereliction of
the duty to discover and prevent the action instead. An unqualified
application of the ex turpi causa principle would preclude any relief to
the plaintiff, notwithstanding the defendant's participation in, or
accountability for, the unlawful activity."o This creates a dilemma
because refusal to aid the guilty plaintiff necessarily confers the benefit
of escaping liability on the defendant who has some accountability for
the illegal conduct. To deal with this dilemma, the law recognizes a
qualification to the ex turpi causa principle, expressed in the maxim in
pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis-where the parties are in
equal guilt, the position of the defendant is the stronger." Although
commonly thought of as a barrier to relief, the in pari delicto rule is in
fact a softening of the absolute bar on recovery expressed in the ex turpi
causa maxim because it recognizes that the ex turpi causa principle may
not bar relief where the plaintiff played a lesser role than the defendant
in the illegal transaction or situation.12
Taken literally, the in pari delicto maxim seems to focus
exclusively on the question of relative guilt. This belies the complexity
of its application, inadequately describes the considerations that courts
evaluate in deciding on whether to refuse relief, and engenders doctrinal
confusion." Although the relative guilt of the parties is a highly relevant
consideration, it is just one of many factors that courts take into account,
and it is often overcome by other considerations that carry more weight
with courts under the circumstances of the case.14 Therefore, even
though courts regularly invoke the maxim in dealing with claims arising
10. Again, some of the older cases express this principle in delightfully purple prose. See,
e.g., Manning v. Noa, 76 N.W.2d 75, 77 (Mich. 1956); Stone v. Freeman, 82 N.E.2d 571, 572 (N.Y.
1948) ("[N]o court should be required to serve as paymaster of the wages of crime, or referee
between thieves."); Nellis v. Clark, 20 Wend. 24, 32 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838) ("[N]either . . .[the
plaintiff nor the defendant] have any positive remedy on their own account. But as the law finds
them, so it will leave them. They derive that kind of negative assistance which arises from their
cases being mutually such that the law will not tarnish its hands by rescuing them from the mire.").
11. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Cooper & Lybrand LLP, 322 F.3d 147, 158 (2d
Cir. 2003).
12. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
13. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny Health Educ. & Res. Found. v.
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 607 F.3d 346, 350 n.2 (3d Cir. 2010) (describing the in pari delicto rule
as a "murky area of law .. . [and] an ill-defined group of doctrines that prevents courts from
becoming involved in disputes in which adverse parties are equally at fault"); Johnson, supra note 3,
at 71-73 (arguing that the in paridelicto maxim disorients analysis by its focus on relative fault, and
that the real issue as not equality of fault, but whether the plaintiffs actions are so serious and
closely related to his loss that it is fair to deny recovery).
14. See infra Part HI.
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out of illegal action by the plaintiff and defendant," it is not really true
to state that where the parties are in pari delicto, the defendant's position
is inevitably stronger. It may or may not be, depending on a multifaceted
evaluation of fact-specific situations in which the court exercises
considerable discretion in balancing fault, the seriousness of the offense,
the public interest, and the equities between the parties.' 6
The complexity of this analysis and the widely-variant factual
situations to which it is applied allow courts considerable discretion to
apply the rule in a way that best achieves the goals that it is meant to
serve. However, in some situations, particularly where the plaintiff is not
the actual wrongdoer but a party who has succeeded to the wrongdoer's
cause of action for the benefit of innocent victims of the illegal conduct,
many courts have adopted a doctrinaire approach to imputing the
wrongdoing to the plaintiff, thereby losing sight of the true purpose and
point of the rule."
This Article begins with an exposition of the in pari delicto rule as
it applies in situations in which the plaintiff is the lawbreaker." Part II
describes the nature, purpose, and scope of the in paridelicto rule.1 9 Part
III examines the complex and multifaceted balancing process that courts
use in applying the rule.20
Part IV addresses the imputation of an agent's illegal action to the
principal.2 1 The following common situation provides a concrete
illustration of the kind of case in which imputation occurs: The agent is
an officer in control of a corporation. He engages in serious criminal
activity during the course of conducting the corporation's business. For
example, he operates a Ponzi scheme in which he fraudulently induces
investments, but instead of investing the funds as promised, he
misappropriates the funds for his own purposes and conceals the theft
for some time by using a portion of later investments to repay earlier
investors. He thereby creates the false impression that funds have been
well invested and are earning the expected returns. Inevitably, the Ponzi
scheme collapses and the fraud is discovered. The dishonest officer is
ousted and prosecuted. It becomes apparent that some other person with
a fiduciary duty to the corporation-say its lawyer or auditor--either
15. See, e.g., Picard v. JPMorgan Chase & Co. (In re Bernard L. MadoffInv. Sec. LLC), 721
F.3d 54, 63 (2d Cir. 2013).
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra PartV.
18. See infra Parts 11-III.
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part Il.
21. See infra Part IV.
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knew or should have known that the officer was conducting a Ponzi
scheme but abetted it or failed to take action to prevent or report it. The
corporation sues the complicit or negligent lawyer or auditor to recover
losses attributable to the lawyer or auditor's role in colluding in or
enabling the illegal activity. The lawyer or auditor raises the in pari
delicto defense on the theory that the corporation itself is a guilty
plaintiff because the actions of the officer, in the course of his
employment, are imputed to it. Courts commonly apply principles of
imputation rigorously against the corporation, making it almost
impossible for the corporation to distance itself from the actions of its
officer.22 in some cases, this is the proper result, but in others, where the
fault of the complicit party is egregious and the principal's recovery
would compensate innocent victims of the illegal action, refusal of relief
is inconsistent with the purpose of the in pari delicto rule.
Part V deals with an even more troublesome application of
imputation, in which the sins of the wrongdoing officer are imposed
upon a plaintiff who is even further removed from the illegal action, and
whose sole purpose is to recover from a complicit party for the benefit of
victims of the illegality. 23 Using the same example, the officer's Ponzi
scheme so badly damaged the financial viability of the corporation that it
collapses after the scheme is uncovered, and the corporation is placed
into receivership or bankruptcy. The task of the receiver or trustee is to
recover monies for the estate to ultimately benefit creditors (including
the defrauded investors) who are victims of the Ponzi scheme.24 In
fulfilling this task, the receiver or trustee sues the lawyer or auditor for
losses resulting from its deliberate or negligent failure to prevent the
officer's illegal conduct. This suit is met with the in pari delicto defense
on the theory that the trustee or receiver is subject to any defenses that
could have been raised against the corporation. 25 Based on an intricate
set of variables, courts reject this argument in some situations but accept
it in others.26 Where courts allow the defense, they insulate the

.

22. See, e.g., Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, 708 F.3d 470, 496 (3d Cir. 2013) (finding
imputation on investment advisor finn appropriate if senior executive made fraudulent statements
within the scope of his authority); Seidman & Seidman v. Gee, 625 So. 2d. 1, 3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992) ("Where it is shown . .. that a corporate officer's fraud intended to and did benefit the
corporation .. . the fraud is imputed to the corporation . .
23.

See infra Part V.

24. See infra Part V.
25. See infra Part V.
26. See infra Part V.
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wrongdoing defendant from accountability for its role in the illegal
action and deprive victims of relief.27
Part VI argues that this is a perversion of the in pari delicto rule
that courts could avoid by better use of the ample discretion allowed by
the rule, a less rigid approach to imputation, and a clearer focus on the
underlying purpose of the rule.28
II.

THE NATURE, PURPOSE, AND SCOPE OF THE INPARIDELICTO RULE

In a suit brought by a plaintiff arising from an illegal transaction or
interaction, the in pari delicto rule manifests as an affirmative defense
by a defendant who participated in or bears some responsibility for the
plaintiffs illegal conduct. This Part explains the rationale, concept, and
scope of the in paridelicto rule, its nature as an affirmative defense, and
the wide range of transactions or interactions in which the defense might
be raised.29 It also discusses the relationship of the rule to the closelyrelated equitable doctrine of unclean hands and the wrongful conduct
rule of tort law.30
A.

The Rationale of the In Pari Delicto Rule

The in pari delicto maxim is of ancient origin. It can be traced to
Roman law and first appeared in English law during the eighteenth
century.3 1 It has been part of American law for nearly as long.3 2 It is
widely recognized and applied in American jurisdictions by both state
and federal courts.
The policies behind the refusal to aid a plaintiff who has broken the
law are routinely enunciated by courts and commentators. The most
obvious public policy is to uphold the law that has been violated, rather

27. See infra PartV.A.
28. See infra PartVI.
29. See infra Part II.A-D.
30. See infra Part II.E.
31. For brief history of the maxim, its Roman Law origins, and its early use in English Law,
see J.K. Grodecki, In Pari Delicto Potior Est Conditio Defendentis, 71 L.Q. REv., 254, 254-58
(1955). Grodecki identifies Lord Mansfield as first applying the doctrine in England in the case of
Smith v. Bromley (1790) 99 Eng. Rep. 441; 2 Doug. 696. Holman v. Johnson is regarded as the
seminal case in which Lord Mansfield expressed both the ex turpi causa principle and the in pan
delicto rule. (1775) 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121; 1 Cowp. 342, 343.
32. See Kirscher v. KPMG, LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 950 (N.Y. 2010) (citing New York cases
from the early nineteenth century, the court observed that the in pari delicto doctrine "has been
wrought in the inmost texture of our common law for at least two centuries").
33. See, e.g., Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1985);
Kirscher, 938 N.E.2d at 950.
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than to reward its violation. 4 The refusal of relief is also aimed at
discouraging subsequent violations of the law by creating a disincentive
to enter into this or any other illegal transaction in the future." Courts
also commonly express the concern about not becoming embroiled in a
dispute between lawbreakers, which could result in the improper use of
judicial power in abetting unlawful conduct.36 Some courts also
articulate a concern about public perception-that granting relief to a
lawbreaker might cause the public to view the legal system as a mockery
of justice and the mere tool of the iniquitous." While some courts
concede that punishment of the plaintiff is one of the motivations of the
rule,3 8 others take pains to stress that the refusal to aid the plaintiff is not
punitive, but rather serves the broader policies of deterring such conduct
and protecting the integrity of the judicial system and the overall public

34. Schlueter v. Latek, 683 F.3d. 350, 355 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that if awarding relief to an
equally guilty plaintiff would reward wrongdoing, courts will not adjudicate the dispute); Orzel ex
rel. Orzel v. Scott Drug Co., 537 N.W.2d 208, 213 (Mich. 1995) (noting that by giving relief to
the wrongdoer, a court would condone and encourage illegal conduct); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS ch. 8, topic 1, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (stating that the policy of
freedom of contract requires the enforcement of consensual agreements, but where a contract
violates the law, this policy might be outweighed by a stronger public interest in upholding the law
that has been violated).
35. The question of creating a disincentive to future conduct is problematic, as discussed in
Part III. Nevertheless, this is often expressed as a policy. See, e.g., Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 306
(1985) (stating that the in pari delicto defense is grounded on two premises: (1) courts should not
mediate disputes between wrongdoers, and (2) the denial of judicial relief is an effective means of
deterring illegality); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8, topic 1, intro. note (stating that

refusal of enforcement is not so much based on "solicitude for the promisor," but arises from two
fundamental considerations-first, to sanction and discourage the improper conduct, and second, to
prevent the use of the judicial process in "carrying out an unsavory transaction").

36. This oft-expressed rationale is nicely articulated in McCausland v. Ralston, where the
court stated: "[Tihe law will not be the willing instrument of its own subversion, and to every
appeal for assistance replies, in pari delicto potior est conditis defendentis." 12 Nev. 195, 204

(1877). However, this argument is something of an overstatement because courts often find
themselves embroiled in unsavory situations (for example, in a criminal case in which a technical
defense is raised) in which the law requires them to adjudicate in favor of a person who has engaged
in illegal conduct. See Wade, supra note 4, at 41-44.
37. Orzel, 537 N.W.2d at 213 (determining that allowing a wrongdoer to profit from his
illegal acts will cause the public to view the legal system as a mockery ofjustice). This seems to be
largely a rhetorical point. As pointed out in MCA Financial Corp. v. Grant Thornton, the public
could equally perceive it to be a mockery of justice not to allow relief against the defendant who is,
after all, also a lawbreaker. 687 N.W.2d 850, 855 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).
38. See Inhabitants of Worcester v. Eaton, 11 Mass. 368, 377 (1814) ("You have paid the
price of your wickedness, and you must not have the aid of the law to rid you of an inconvenience
which is a suitable punishment for your offence."); Meador v. Hotel Grover, 9 So. 2d 782, 786
(Miss. 1942) ("[Plaintiffs] right to invoke the power of the law to protect can be neutralized only
by the power of the law to punish."); Wade, supra note 4, at 36, 36 n.21 (identifying cases in which
courts articulate a punitive purpose in refusing relief).
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good." This does not suggest that refusal of relief has no punitive impact
on the plaintiff, with a corresponding boon to the wrongdoing defendant.
Rather, the point is that punishment is usually best left to penal
provisions of the law and should not be the focus of the decision to
refuse relief under the in pari delicto rule.
It is relatively easy for a court to feel confident in serving these
policies where the plaintiff bears overwhelming responsibility for an
egregious violation of the law and the decision to refuse any remedy
clearly protects an important public interest. However, where the parties'
guilt is more evenly balanced, the violation of the law is less outrageous,
and the public interest in the refusal or denial of relief is more equivocal,
the degree to which a particular resolution might advance respect for the
law and public policy becomes less clear. As Part III shows, in such
cases the right decision can be elusive, conjectural, and dependent on the
perceptions of the judge.4 0
B.

In Pari Delicto as an Equitable Affirmative Defense

While it is not entirely clear if the in pari delicto rule was originally
adopted by courts of law or equity, courts uniformly describe it as an
equitable doctrine. 4 ' The precise derivation of the doctrine is not legally
significant because, unlike some other equitable doctrines, 42 Courts do
not confine it to suits in equity, and no court has refused to apply it on

39. See Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 318 (stating that punishment of the plaintiffs is best left
to the substantial criminal and civil penalties for violating the securities laws); Small v. Parker
Healthcare Mgmt. Org., Inc., No. 05-ll-01471-CV, 2013 WL 5827822, at *3 (Tex. App. Oct. 28,
2013) ("The purpose behind this rule is not to protect or punish either party, but to protect and
benefit the public.") (citing Plumlee v. Paddock, 832 S.W.2d 757, 759 (Tex. App. 1947)).
40.

See infra Part IH.

&

41. The equitable nature of the in pari delicto rule is generally asserted baldly, without any
explanation or citation of historical sources. See, e.g., Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 632 (1988);
Nisselson v. Lernout, 469 F.3d 143, 151 (1st Cir. 2006); Glenbrook Capital Ltd. P'ship v. Dodds (In
re Amerco Derivative Litig.), 252 P.3d 681, 694 (Nev. 2011); Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Deloitte
Touche, LLP, 888 N.Y.S.2d 538, (2009); Geis v. Colina Del Rio LP, 362 S.W.3d 100, 107
(Tex. App. 2011). However, some commentators identify the roots of in pari delicto as legal,
not equitable. See T. Leigh Anenson, Treating Equity Like Law: A Post-MergerJustification of
Unclean Hands, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 455,483-84 (2008); Grodecki, supranote 31, at 258 (stating that
the rule was applied initially by courts of law, and was thereafter followed with some reluctance by
courts of equity).
42. For example, as discussed below, some courts confine the unclean hands doctrinewhich is closely linked to the in pari delicto rule-to suits in equity. See infra note 90 and
accompanying text.
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the grounds that the suit is legal in nature.43 The characterization of the
rule as one of equity allows courts the discretion to take equitable
considerations into account in applying the rule and support the wideranging equitable balancing that is described in Part III."
Courts also routinely treat in pari delicto as an affirmative defense
to the plaintiff's claim, so that the defendant must plead and prove the
facts necessary to invoke the defense.45 In some cases, the defense
raises disputed questions of fact that require resolution by trial.4 6
However, if the crucial facts relating to the defense are apparent
from or conceded in the pleadings so that there is no factual dispute
to be decided at trial, it may be disposed of summarily on
either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment.47
43. See Nash v. Jones, 162 S.E.2d 392, 394 (Ga. 1968) ("Neither a court of law nor a court of
equity will lend its aid to a party where it affirmatively appears that the plaintiff and defendant are
in paridelicto.") (citing Clifton v. Dunn, 66 S.E.2d 735 (Ga. 1951)).
44. See infra Part III.
45. Rogers v. Mc.Dorman, 521 F.3d 381, 386 (5th Cir. 2008) (stating that inparidelicto is an
affirmative defense and must be raised as such with specificity so as to give the plaintiff fair notice
that it is being advanced); Nisselson, 469 F.3d at 151 (stating in pari delicto is an affirmative
defense); Tamposi v. Denby, 974 F. Supp. 2d 51, 56 (D. Mass. 2013) (determining in paridelictois
an affirmative defense, so that the facts establishing it must be definitively ascertainable from the
complaint and must be sufficient to establish the defense with certitude); In re Appalachian Fuels,
LLC, No. 09-10343, 2012 WL 4059973, at *1-2 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Sept. 14, 2012) (labeling in pari
delicto as an affirmative defense); Gamboa v. Alvarado, 941 N.E.2d 1012, 1016 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011)
(stating that illegality is an affirmative defense in which, although the party admitted the sufficiency
of the complaint, he raised a defense that negates the cause of action).
46. In the absence of a conclusive resolution on the pleadings, the matter must go to trial on
the facts. See Scola v. Constantino Richards Rizzo, LLP, No. MICV2012-01269-D, 2013 WL
1342292, at *3 (Mass. Super. Mar. 28, 2013) (refusing to dismiss a malpractice suit against
accountants on the basis of the in pari delicto defense where a trial was required to determine the
relative fault of the parties); MCA Financial Corp. v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 687 N.W.2d 850, 852
(Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (finding summary judgment inappropriate because there was a material issue
of fact); Skinner v. EF, Hutton & Co., 333 S.E.2d 236 (N.C. 1985) (holding that although the
plaintiffs participation in an illegal insider trading scheme was apparent from the complaint, this
did not establish conclusively that this participation would preclude suit).
47. See, e.g., Nisselson, 469 F.3d at 158 (holding that a motion to dismiss may be granted
where the success of the affirmative defense is inevitable because the facts can be ascertained and
are enough to establish the defense with certitude); Uecker v. Wells Fargo Capital Fin., LLC (In re
Mortg. Fund '08 LLC), 527 B.R. 351, 369-70 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (determining that where the
plaintiff's pleadings contain admissions that establish the in pari delicto defense, the matter can be
disposed of summarily); In re Singh, No. 10-42050-D-7, 2015 WL 1887939, at *2-3 (Bankr. E.D.
Cal. Apr. 22, 2015) (finding that where the defendant makes a prima facie showing that the in pari
delicto defense applies, the matter can be disposed of summarily unless the plaintiff can show a
genuine issue of material fact); Bush v.,Textron Fin. Corp., 483 BR. 630, 650 (N.D. Ohio 2012)
(holding that where the plaintiff conceded that it had defrauded investors, the in pari delicto defense
can be disposed of on the pleadings); OHC Liquidation Tr. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (In re
Oakwood Homes Corp.), 389 B.R. 357, 372 (D. Del. 2008) (concluding that in pari delicto can be
established on the pleadings in a motion to dismiss, and that relative guilt is not a jury question);
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In fact, in many of the cases cited in this Article, courts allowed the
defense on the basis of the pleadings.48
The nature of in pari delicto as an affirmative defense highlights
the ironic aspect of the rule-although the court could raise the illegality
of the transaction sua sponte,49 it is hard to find a case in which this has
occurred. Nor is the challenge to the plaintiffs suit brought by some
public agency or public-spirited third party. Rather, the illegality is
raised by the very person who participated in or enabled the plaintiffs
illegal conduct. In some cases, the defendant may have genuinely
repented of his role in the violation of the law or may have been coerced
or misled into participation by the plaintiff. However, in many cases, the
defendant's behavior was quite unsavory, and his motive in asserting the
defense is nothing more than an effort to escape accountability for his
own wrongful conduct on the grounds that the plaintiffs behavior was
worse. This leaves the court with the distasteful choice between allowing
Oden v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of Decatur, 621 So. 2d 953, 954-55 (Ala. 1993) (determining that
summary judgment is appropriate where it is undisputed that the plaintiff engaged in an illegal act
and relies on that act for his claim); Joint Equity Comm. v. Genovese, No. G048238, 2014 WL
4162318, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2014) (establishing that the defense can prevail at the
pleading stage if the plaintiffs own pleadings contain admissions that establish the defense); Price
v. Purdue Pharma Co., 920 So. 2d 479, 485-86 (Miss. 2006) (holding summary judgment for the
defendants to be appropriate where it was uncontroverted that the plaintiff had engaged in a scheme
to get multiple prescriptions for a controlled drug); Teneyck, Inc. v. Rosenberg, 957 N.Y.S.2d 845,
848-49 (Sup. Ct. 2013) (determining that the case can be disposed of on a motion to dismiss where
both parties admitted bribery and conceded equal guilt).
48. See cases cited supra note 47.
49. Affirmative defenses are usually waived if not asserted by the defendant. See Wood v.
Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826, 1832 (2012) ("Ordinarily in civil litigation . . an affirmative defense,
once forfeited, is 'excluded from the case' . . . and, as a rule, cannot be asserted on appeal."
(citations omitted)). However, the public policy against granting relief arising out of an illegal
transaction muddies this principle in the case of the in pari delicto defense, so that some courts
assert the power to raise it sua sponte. See Taylor v. AIA Servs. Corp., 261 P.3d 829, 841-42 (Idaho
2011) (explaining that the plaintiff cannot invoke waiver or estoppel to counter the in pari delicto
defense, and the court can raise the illegality sua sponte); Small v. Parker Healthcare Mgmt. Org.,
Inc., No. 05-l1-01471-CV, 2013 WL 5827822, at *5 (Tex. App. Oct. 29, 2013) (holding that
although failure to plead illegality is a waiver of the defense, it can be asserted or raised by the court
sua sponte, even in the absence of pleading, where illegality appears on the face of the contract or
from evidence necessary to prove it). There is some confusion over whether the defense can be
waived at all. This seems to depend on whether the transaction is voidable (in which case it can be
waived) or void (in which case it cannot). Sometimes courts describe an illegal transaction as void.
See, e.g., Taylor, 261 P.3d at 841-42. In some cases, the statute that forbids the transaction itself
declares that any transaction that violates the statute is void. See, e.g., Ground Control, LLC v.
Capsco Indus., Inc., 120 So. 3d 365, 368 (Miss. 2013) (citing a statute requiring contractors to have
certificates of responsibility that declared contract in violation of the statute would be null and void)
(citing Miss. CODE ANN. § 31-3-15 (2015)); Kelley v. Courtier, 30 P. 372, 374 (Okla. 1892) (stating
that a waiver of the defense of illegality "would be tainted with the vice of the original contract and
void for the same reason").
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the guilty plaintiff to sue or the guilty defendant to escape liability."o The
way in which courts grapple with this dilemma is one of the dominant
themes of this Article.
C.

The Concept andScope ofIllegality in Relation to the
In Pari Delicto Rule

1. The Relationship Between Illegality and Denial of Relief
It is self-evident that a transaction is illegal if it is prohibited by
law.' However, when dealing with the in pari delicto rule, we are not
concerned with any other impact of illegality, such as the possibility of
criminal or civil sanctions for violating the law. We focus purely on the
question of the impact of the illegality on the plaintiffs remedial rights.
Therefore, the question of illegality must go beyond the simple
determination of whether the transaction violates the law to consider
whether that violation should result in the consequence of denial of
remedy. The easiest case for determining unenforceable illegality is
where a statute expressly forbids the transaction at issue and also makes
clear the impact of a violation on the remedial rights of a violator (for

50. This discomfort was expressed and rationalized by Lord Mansfield in Holman v. Johnson,
in which he pointed out that the assertion that a contract is illegal "sounds . . .very ill in the mouth
of the defendant." (1775) 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121; 1 Cowp. 342, 343. However, it is not for the
defendant's sake that the defense is allowed, but rather because courts "will not lend their aid to
such a plaintiff. So if the plaintiff and defendant were to change sides, and the defendant was to
bring his action against the plaintiff, the latter would then have the advantage of it: for where both
are equally in fault, potior est conditio defendentis." Id.
51. Courts and commentators sometimes use the phraseology "illegal or against public
policy" when discussing illegal contracts. See, e.g., Taylor, 261 P.3d at 841 (quoting Trees v.
Kersey, 56 P.3d 765, 768 (Idaho 2002)) ("An illegal contract is one that rests on any consideration
that is contrary to law or public policy."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS Ch. 8, topic 1,
intro. note 8 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (stating the term "illegality" is avoided in favor of the concept
of unenforceability on grounds of public policy to make it clear that the focus is on enforceability,
rather than on whether there is some other sanction for violating the law); RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS § 512 (AM. LAW INST. 1932) (defining a bargain as illegal if "either its formation or its
performance is criminal, tortious, or otherwise opposed to public policy"); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS § 5.1(A), at 315 (4th ed. 2004). Although the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
advocates this semantic distinction for the sake of clarity, it seems to be more confusing than
clarifying, because the policing of contracts on public policy grounds may not involve illegality at
all. For example, if the plaintiff, a consumer, signifies assent to a standard agreement waiving
the right to claim damages for the defendant's negligence, the contract is not illegal and is not
subject to analysis under the in pari delicto rule. However, a court may conclude, based on all the
circumstances of the case, that the disclaimer is too broad and should not be enforced on grounds of
public policy. Therefore, when discussing the in pari delicto rule, it is best not to introduce the
notion that something short of illegality will justify use of the rule. It is better to think of illegality
as constituting a breach of the law, whether statutory or established by common law precedent.
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example, by stating that a transaction in violation of the statute is void or
unenforceable, or conversely, that despite the violation, one of the
parties may sue for relief, in the form of enforcement, restitution, or
statutory damages).5 2 In the absence of that kind of clear statutory
guidance, common law precedent may resolve the question of the impact
of illegality on remedial rights. However, a court may still find a
transaction to be illegal and subject to the in paridelicto rule, even in the
absence of an express statutory or common law prohibition where it is so
inimical to the public interest that it should be treated as illegal.5 3
Where the court lacks statutory or precedential guidance on the
impact of illegality on the plaintiff's remedial rights, it must decide for
itself if the infraction of the law is severe enough to merit a refusal of
remedy. 54 Courts often distinguish between conduct that involves moral
turpitude-serious wrongdoing that commonly amounts to criminal
conductss-and a less reprehensible violation of some regulation or
administrative rule.S6 Sometimes the term malum in se (wrong in itself)
is used to describe serious wrongdoing, as distinct from malum
prohibitum (wrong merely because it violates some regulation)." The
degree and seriousness of the illegality has some bearing on the
decision of whether to apply' the in pari delicto rule." However,
although courts distinguish a violation of regulatory law from one
involving moral turpitude, this does not mean that a regulatory
violation will always be treated leniently. The regulation may be aimed
at public health or welfare, and its violation could be a serious
52. The impact of the presence or absence of statutory provisions relating to the availability
of a remedy to a party that has violated the statute are discussed more fully in Part III. See infra
Part IB.
53.

See JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS

§ 98, at 567

(5th ed. 2011).

54. The Restatement (Second) ofContracts identifies the seriousness of the misconduct as one
of the factors to be taken into account in deciding not to enforce a contract. 2 RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(c)(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). Comment c to section 178
emphasizes that the decision not to enforce may be too severe a result where the violation of the law
does not merit such a strong response. Id. § 178 cmt. c.
55. Of course, a criminal might not file a lawsuit because of the risk of exposing the crime.
However, where the wrongdoer has been found out and punished criminally, he has nothing to lose
in seeking recovery. Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that a court would react sympathetically to
his suit, given the seriousness of his wrongdoing.
56. According to Grodecki, supra note 31, at 255-56, there is some indication that the
distinction between acts that were illegal and immoral (that would bar relief) and those that were
merely illegal (that would not) was recognized even in Roman times. Id. The distinction was made
early in English cases but was not followed uniformly. Id.
57. FARNSWORTH, supra note 51, § 5.5(C), at 335 (questioning the usefulness of this
distinction, which does little to further the balancing of considerations called for in approaching
questions of illegality).
58. Id. § 5.1(A), at 315.
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matter, particularly where the infringement was deliberate. 9 In cases
involving illegality in a contract, a court may be willing to sever an
illegal term and enforce the remainder of the contract provided that the
illegality does not permeate the entire contract, and the violation of the
law is not serious misconduct.o
2. The Relationship Between the Transaction and the Illicit
Conduct
The relationship between the transaction and the illegality is
sometimes clear. In the most direct case, the law might be violated
because the transaction itself is prohibited. For example, the unlawful
action is fully implicated and inseparable from the transaction where a
gambler sues for his winnings in an illegal gambling transaction, where
one thief sues another to recover his share of the loot, or where the buyer
of an illegal drug sues the seller for damages for non-delivery. However,
illegality might also exist where an otherwise lawful transaction is
permeated by some illegal action that is associated with it. The
relationship between the illegal action and the transaction could be
close-such as, bribing a person to secure an otherwise lawful contract;
lawfully selling a chemical to a buyer, knowing that the buyer intends to
use it to make an explosive device; or selling goods to the buyer in a
legitimate sale knowing that the buyer intends to smuggle those goods. 6 1
59. See id. §§ 5.6-5.7, at 341-42.
60. Severance of an illegal contract term is possible where the removal of the term cures the
illegal aspect of a contract that does not otherwise offend the law, the severance does not defeat or
significantly alter the basis of the bargain, and the illegality is not so serious as to call for the denial
of that remedy. Id. § 5.8, at 345. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 178(1) (AM. LAW

INST. 1981), speaks of the unenforceability of a "promise or other term of an agreement," and
comment f to section 178 contemplates the possibility that the illegality of one term in the contract
may be sufficiently isolated from the rest of the contract to allow for enforcement of the part of the
contract not affected by the illegality. Id. § 178 cmt f. The comment does observe, however, that in
many contracts, severance will not be possible, and the illegality of one component will cause the
contract as a whole to be unenforceable. Id. Severability of an offending term must be distinguished
from divisibility, under which a court breaks a contract into component parts, avoiding some parts
as illegal and allowing enforcement of others. Id. § 178 cmt. f; id. § 183 cmt. a.; id. § 184. Division
is appropriate only where the contract can be divided into corresponding sets of self-contained and
economically self-standing sets of performances. FARNSWORTH, supra note 51, § 5.8, at 344-45. As
with severance, division is confined to situations in which the illegality is not serious and does not
permeate the contract. See id. § 5.8, at 345.
61. This is what happened in the seminal eighteenth-century case of Holman v. Johnson.
(1775) 98 Eng. Rep. 1120; 1 Cowp. 342. The seller claimed the price of tea, sold in France
and ultimately smuggled into England. Id. at 1120. Although the seller may have known that
the buyer intended to smuggle the tea, the court held that the seller's suit should not be barred
because there was nothing illegal in the sale itself and the seller was not a participant in the
smuggling. Id. at 1122.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2016

13

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 9

794

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:781

Where the illegal action is ancillary to the transaction, its relationship to
and effect on the transaction may not be straightforward and obvious,
and it may not be clear that the illegal conduct is closely linked enough
so as to permeate the transaction.6 2 There must be a direct connection,
not merely an incidental relationship, between the illegal action and the
obligation sued upon. The relationship between the illegality and the
transaction is mirrored in the proximate cause analysis under the
wrongful conduct rule, discussed below.63

D.

The Range of the In Pari Delicto Rule: Illegal Contracts, Breaches
of Statutory or FiduciaryDuty, and Torts

In many cases, the in pari delicto defense is asserted against a claim
arising from an illegal contract.' However, neither the ex turpi causa
principle nor the in pari delicto rule are confined to contractual claims,
but rather express a general principle applicable to all causes of action.
In the cases cited in this Article, the in pari delicto defense has been
raised not only in relation to contractual claims, but also as to claims
arising out of the violation of a statutory duty, a breach of fiduciary duty,
and a tort.65

62. See, e.g., Lamonica v. Safe Hurricane Shutters, Inc., 711 F.3d 1299, 1308-09 (1lth Cir.
2013) (holding that the employee-plaintiffs were not active participants in the employer's labor law
violation, even though they had used false social security numbers and had committed violations of
tax law-there was no causal connection between these acts); Brubaker v. Hi-Banks Resort Corp.,
415 N.W.2d 680, 681, 685-86 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (permitting the seller to sue for the agreed
price of the property, even though he had conspired with the buyers to record a price lower than
agreed to evade tax, because the tax evasion did not render the contract illegal); id. at 686 (Foley, J.,
dissenting) (disagreeing with majority and considering that the evasion of taxes was directly related
to the contract); Meador v. Hotel Grover, 9 So. 2d 782, 784, 786 (Miss. 1942) (finding the illegal
purpose too remote where the decedent was fatally injured in an elevator accident when riding the
elevator to visit a prostitute); id. at 786-87 (Smith, J., dissenting) (finding a direct link between the
use of the elevator and the intended illegal act); Grapico Bottling Co. v. Ennis, 106 So. 2d 97, 98-99
(Miss. 1925) (holding that the buyer had no cause of action for breach of warranty in relation to a
contaminated soft drink bought on a Sunday in violation of a Sunday trading law, but the dissent
argued the suit should be allowed because the contamination of the drink was unrelated to its
improper Sunday sale); McConnell v. Commonwealth Pictures Corp., 166 N.E.2d 494, 496-97
(N.Y. 1960) (refusing to allow the plaintiff to recover on a legal contract because he committed
bribery in the course of performing it); id. at 498-500 (Froessel, J., dissenting) (arguing that since
the contract itself was not illegal, the plaintiff should not be precluded from enforcing it merely
because he committed illegal acts in performing it).
63. See infra text accompanying notes 75-84.
64. See, e.g., Taylor v. AIA Servs. Corp., 261 P.3d 829, 842-43 (Idaho 2011); McConnell,
166 N.E.2d at 495-96; see also Orzel ex rel. Orzel v. Scott Drug Co., 537 N.W.2d 208, 214
(Mich. 1995) (discussing the many instances in which the rule has been applied, including
illegal contracts).
65. See sources cited supra note 62 and infra note 66.
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In the context of tort law,66 the ex turpi causa principle is
manifested in the wrongful conduct rule 67 (also known as the "unlawful
acts" or "unlawful conduct" rule, or the "outlaw" doctrine 68), which bars
relief for tortious injury suffered by a plaintiff who was injured by the
deliberate or negligent actions of the defendant during the course of the
plaintiffs illegal activity." The doctrine derives from common law but
has been given statutory form in some states.7 0 The rationale for the
wrongful conduct rule is that the purpose of the tort compensation
system is to allow an innocent victim to recover for injury caused by the
person responsible for that injury.n That policy is not advanced by
allowing a lawbreaking plaintiff to impose liability on a negligent
defendant where the injury arises directly from the unlawful activity in
which the plaintiff was involved. For example, where corporate officers
had operated a Ponzi scheme, the court held that the wrongful conduct
rule barred the plaintiff corporation's malpractice suit against its

66. The wrongful conduct rule is almost always applied to tort claims. See, e.g., Oden v. Pepsi
Cola Bottling Co. of Decatur, 621 So. 2d 953, 954-55 (Ala. 1993); Orzel, 537 N.W.2d at 210.
However, it is occasionally used in other situations involving wrongful conduct. For example, in
Kohut v. Metzler Loricchio Seera & Co., P.C. (In re Munivest Servs., LLC), the wrongful conduct

rule was applied to a contract-based malpractice claim against an accountant who had enabled fraud
by the officer ofa corporation. 500 B.R. 487,491,493, 500 (E.D. Mich. 2013).
67. See, e.g., Kohut, 500 BR. at 494-95 (discussing the wrongful conduct rule and applying to
tort action); Greenwald v. Van Handel, 88 A.3d 467, 472-78 (Conn. 2013) (establishing precedence
for the using of the wrongful conduct rule to apply the ex turpi causa principle to negligence suits in
tort as a matter of policy); Orzel, 537 N.W.2d at 212-14 (discussing the wrongful conduct rule and
applying to tort action).
68. Dugger v. Arrendondo, 408 S.W.3d 825, 829 (Tex. 2013); Johnson, supra note 3, at
44-46.
69. Some courts require that the activity must constitute a serious criminal offense. See
Greenwald, 88 A.3d at 473 ("Courts ... have limited the rule's application to cases in which the
plaintiff's injuries stem from conduct that is prohibited, as opposed to merely regulated, by law, and
the violation is 'serious' or involves 'moral turpitude."' (citations omitted)); Orzel, 537 N.W.2d at
208 ("[T]o implicate the wrongful-conduct rule, the conduct must be serious in nature and
prohibited under a penal or criminal statute."). However, not all states require that plaintiffs claim
arise out of a felony but extend the doctrine to any form of wrongful conduct. See Johnson, supra
note 3, at 52 & n.52. For example, in Lee v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., the Virginia

Supreme Court applied the doctrine to a minor who was injured while joyriding in a car, driven by
his friend who had taken his parents' car without permission. 497 S.E.2d 328, 328-31 (Va. 1998).
The Fifth Circuit observed that the case law provided so many permutations of the scope of the
doctrine that it was difficult to state the contours of the rule with certainty. Rico v. Flores, 481 F.3d
234, 241-44 (5th Cir. 2008).
70. Johnson, supra note 3, at 49-62.
71. Greenwald, 88 A.3d at 477; see also Orzel, 537 N.W.2d at 213 ("The rationale that
Michigan courts have used to support the wrongful conduct rule are rooted in the public policy that
courts should not lend their aid to a plaintiff who founded his cause of action on his own illegal
conduct." (citations omitted)); Johnson, supra note 3, at 49-53.
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accountant because granting relief to the plaintiff would condone its
officer's wrongdoing and shift responsibility to its auditors.72
The rationale for the rule is not universally accepted. Some judges
and commentators have argued that the rule undermines the tort
principle of holding a tortfeasor accountable for his conduct and have
questioned whether the wrongful conduct rule is compatible with
contemporary principles of comparative fault.73 However, the wrongful
conduct rule does not conflict with these principles because it is not
concerned with the role that the plaintiff s own negligence played in the
injury, but rather with the fact that the plaintiffs injury arose in the
course of illegal activity.74
The wrongful conduct rule only bars relief if there is a clear nexus
between the plaintiffs illegal conduct and his injury. 7s The injury must
be traceable to the violation of the law by a real and identifiable causeand-effect relationship. 76 The unlawful act need not have been the only
proximate cause, but must have been a proximate cause-one of the
72. MCA Fin. Corp. v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 687 N.W.2d 850, 851-52 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2004).
73. See Greenwald, 88 A.3d at 480-81, 483-85 (Eveleigh, J., dissenting) (arguing that tort law
should focus on the defendants duty of care, not on the plaintiffs wrongful conduct, and the
wrongful conduct rule undermines the principle of comparative negligence and resuscitates the
older doctrine of contributory negligence, under which the plaintiff was barred from recovery if his
negligence contributed to the injury); Stolicker v. Kohl's Dep't Stores, Inc., No. 302573, 2012 WL
676391, at *6-7 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (Gleicher, J., dissenting) (noting that the wrongful conduct
doctrine was abrogated when the legislature abolished contributory negligence in favor of
comparative negligence). Vincent R. Johnson sees the doctrine as a partial revival of the outlaw
doctrine of older tort law, under which a person who engaged in unlawful activity could be
injured with impunity. Johnson, supra note 3, at 44-46. He argues that although the outlaw
doctrine is no longer a part of tort law, it has reemerged to some extent in the wrongful conduct
doctrine's preclusion of compensation where the plaintiffs injury arises out of his serious unlawful
conduct. Id.
74. See Greenwald, 88 A.3d at 476-77 (determining that because the wrongful conduct rule
applies only where the plaintiffs injury was caused by his own illegal conduct, it is not negated by
the comparative negligence principle, which allows the plaintiff to recover even if his own
negligence contributed to his injuries); Rosenbach v. The Diversified Group, Inc. 926 N.Y.S.2d 49,
51-52 (App. Div. 2011) (holding that the wrongful conduct rule does not preclude a contribution
claim among joint tortfeasors for injury to third parties, even if the tortfeasors engaged in illegal
activity, because this is not a claim for injury to the plaintiff-tortfeasors themselves). But cf Dugger
v. Arredono, 408 S.W.3d 825, 830-33 (Tex. 2013) (holding that the statute that abolished
contributory negligence extended to the unlawful acts doctrine and removed the complete bar to
recovery under the common law doctrine).
75. Greenwald, 88 A.3d at 473 ("[C]ourts have universally recognized that there must be a
sufficient causal nexus between the plaintiff's illegal conduct and his alleged injuries to bar
recovery." (citations omitted)).
76. Oden v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 621 So. 2d 953, 955 (Ala. 1993) (barring "any action
seeking damages based on injuries that were a direct result of the injured party's knowing and
intentional participation in a crime involving moral turpitude").
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directly-contributing circumstances leading to the injury-and not
merely collateral to or tangentially related to it.n Where proximate cause
does not exist, the injury was not suffered in the course of the illegal
conduct, which was merely ancillary to it, and the claim should not be
affected by the plaintiffs wrongful conduct.78 in some cases, the causal
relationship is clear because the plaintiffs injury occurs during the
illegal action and arises directly out of that action (for example, where
the plaintiff was injured by excessive use of a drug for which he
fraudulently obtained prescriptions 79 or the plaintiff was thrown from the
bed of a truck while engaged in throwing rocks from it).so In other cases,
however, it is more problematic to decide whether proximate cause
exists (for example, where the plaintiff was injured in the course of
being apprehended following a theft" or the plaintiff was killed by an
77. Rubio v. Motowski, No. 289526, 2010 WL 2540818, at *1-2 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010);
Brassell v. Laban, No. 252749, 2006 WL 782163, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006); Quick v. Samp, 697
N.W.2d 741, 747-48 (S.D. 2005) (noting that the plaintiff's injury need not be the proximate cause,
as long as it is a proximate cause).
78. Greenwald, 88 A.3d at 473-74, 477 (supporting the proposition that a person should not
be barred from tort relief merely because he has broken the law-a lawbreaker is just as much
entitled to protection from tortious acts as a law-abiding citizen unless his injury arises out of the
very act of breaking the law and is directly related to it); Orzel ex rel. Orzel v. Scott Drug Co., 537
N.W.2d 208, 215-16 (Mich. 1995) (holding that the wrongful conduct rule does not apply where the
illegal conduct is only incidentally or collaterally connected with the cause of action).
79. In Price v. Perdue PharmaCo., the plaintiff, by misrepresenting his medical history and
treatment to various doctors, managed to get multiple prescriptions for OxyContin, a strong
painkiller and a controlled medication. 920 So. 2d 479, 482-83 (Mo. 2006). He was clearly guilty of
violating the law by misleading the doctors and improperly having multiple prescriptions filled. Id
He later sued the doctors and the pharmacy for malpractice, claiming that he had been injured by his
excessive use of the addictive drug. Id. at 481-82. Citing the ex dolo malo principle and the
wrongful conduct rule, the court dismissed his suit. Id. at 484-86. The court held that his violation of
the law was a proximate cause of his injury, and was not merely a remote or contributing cause. Id.
at 485-86.
80. In Rubio, the decedent was killed by being thrown from the bed of a truck driven
recklessly by the defendant after passing a house at which the decedent, standing on the bed of the
truck, threw rocks. 2010 WL 2540818, at *2. The court barred the decedent's estate from recovering
from the defendant because it found that the decedent's illegal activity was a proximate cause of his
death. Id. at *2-3.
81. In Stolicker v. Kohl's Department Stores, Inc., the majority of the court held that the
plaintiff's illegal act was a proximate cause of her injury where she incurred the injury in a tussle
with store security personnel in a store's parking lot after fleeing the store with shoplifted
merchandise. No. 302573, 2012 WL 676391, at *1-3 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2012). It considered
that the shoplifting was a proximate cause of the injury because it set in motion a chain of events
leading to the injury. Id. at *3. However, the dissent disagreed that the plaintiffs shoplifting was a
proximate cause of her subsequent injury. Id. (Gleicher, J., dissenting). It was not an integral part of
the plaintiffs case, but was merely a remote link in the circumstances leading up to the injury
suffered by her in the parking lot. Id. at *4 (Gleicher, J., dissenting). No such qualms were voiced in
Brassell, where the court found that the plaintiffs theft was a proximate cause of his injury when he
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improperly-secured vending machine that fell on him while he was
attempting to steal drinks from it).82 The most ambiguous cases are those
in which the plaintiff is injured, not in the course of committing the
wrongful act, but rather in preparing to commit it, or after it has
been completed (for example, where the plaintiff was crushed in an
elevator while riding to an assignation with a prostitute" or where
the plaintiff was injured by stepping into a hole while leaving an illegal
bingo game).8 4
In some cases, such as those involving the police officers or
security personnel who injured the plaintiff after the plaintiff had
committed the illegal act85 or the manufacturer and owner of the vending
machine that fell onto the plaintiff,86 the defendants were not participants
in the plaintiffs' illegal actions, but were sued for negligence that
allegedly occurred before or after the illegal conduct." In such a
situation, the in pari delicto rule has no application. However, in other
cases, such as the case in which the rock-throwing plaintiff was injured
by the reckless driving of his cohort, the tortfeasor participated in the
illegal action in which the plaintiff was injured. 8 Because the wrongful
conduct rule is a manifestation of the ex turpi causa principle, the in pari
was hit by a patrol car while fleeing from the police. No. 252749, 2006 WL 782163, at *1-2 (Mich.
Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2006).
82. In Oden, the decedent was killed when a vending machine fell on him as he was trying to
tilt it to steal drinks from it. 621 So. 2d 953, 954 (Ala. 1993). The majority of the court barred his
estate's negligence claim against the manufacturer and owner of the machine because the decedent's
injury was incurred in the course of his illegal act involving moral turpitude. Id at 954-55.
However, the dissent disagreed that the decedent's injury was incurred in the course of committing
the crime of theft. Id. at 957 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent reasoned that the claim of the
decedent's estate was based purely on the negligence of the manufacturer and owner of the machine
in not securing it properly, and the estate therefore did not have to rely on the decedent's theft to
establish its case. Id. at 956-58 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
83. In Meador v. Hotel Grover, the decedent was crushed to death while riding in a hotel
elevator on his way to meet with a prostitute in a hotel room. 9 So. 2d 782, 783-84 (Miss. 1942).
The court held that his intended illegal purpose of patronizing a prostitute was not sufficiently
linked to the elevator ride as to preclude relief for the injury. Id. at 785-86. However, it could have
been argued that the only reason for his being in the elevator was his unlawful purpose.
84. In Manning v. Noa, the plaintiff fell and injured herself when she stepped into a hole on
church property on her way home after participating in an illegal bingo game at the church. 76
N.W.2d 75, 76 (Mich. 1956). The court refused to bar her claim, holding that her unlawful activity
was collateral to and not causally connected to her injury. Id. at 7 -78. The court said that it was not
enough that the illegal activity had some remote link in the chain of causation, even though she
would not have been walking through the church property had she not been leaving the illegal game.
Id. at 78.
85. See Stolicker, 2012 WL 676391, at *1; Brassell, 2006 WL 782163, at *1.
86. Oden, 621 So. 2d at 954.
87. See id.; Stolicker, 2012 WL676391, at *1; Brassel, 2006 WL 782163, at *1.
88. Rubio v. Motowski, No. 289526, 2010 WL 2540818, at *2 (Mich. June 24,2010).
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delicto rule operates in this situation and should only bar suit for the
injury if the factors in the overall balance (including the plaintiffs lesser
degree of guilt) call for a denial of relief. 9
E.

The Relationship Between the In Pari Delicto Rule and the
Unclean Hands Doctrine

The unclean hands doctrine, long recognized in courts of equity,
proclaims that a party who seeks relief from a court of equity must come
to court with clean hands-she must not have engaged in unjust or
inequitable conduct in relation to the matter for which she seeks relief.90
The doctrine is aimed not only at protecting the defendant who is the
victim of the inequitable conduct, but also at protecting the court and
advancing justice.9 ' The doctrine is in one respect broader and in another
respect narrower than the ex turpi causa principle. It is broader in that,
unlike the ex turpi causa principle, it is not confined to situations in
which the plaintiff has acted illegally in the transaction on which the
claim is founded. The unclean hands doctrine extends beyond that to
cover conduct, which, even if lawful, is inequitable in relation to the
transaction or with regard to the litigation itself.92 For the plaintiff to be
89. See Rubio, 2010 WL 2540818, at *2-3 (allowing the defendant to assert the inparidelicto
defense against the estate's wrongful death claim because the decedent and defendant were equally
guilty of the illegal act and the decedent was killed in the course of committing the illegal act);
Orzel ex rel. Orzel v. Scott Drug Co., 537 N.W.2d 208, 212-15 (Mich. 1995) (refusing tort relief
under the in pari delicto rule where the plaintiff, who sued negligent doctors and a pharmacy for
injury sustained as a result of his excessive use of a controlled drug, had dishonestly procured
multiple prescriptions for the drug); Dugger v. Arredondo, 408 S.W.3d 825, 829 (Tex. 2013)
(recognizing that the unlawful acts doctrine is an extension to tort actions of the principle of in pari
delicto and unclean hands); see also Johnson, supra note 3, at 70-71 (discussing the application of
the inpari delicto defense in legal malpractice actions). But see Rosenbach v. The Diversified Grp.,
Inc., 926 N.Y.S.2d 49, 51-52 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (permitting contribution claims among
tortfeasors who are in paridelicto).
90. See Epstein v. Epstein, 915 So. 2d 1272, 1275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Schneider v.
Schneider, 644 A.2d 510, 514 (Md. 1994) (applying the unclean hands doctrine only where there is
a nexus between the plaintiff s improper conduct and her claim).
91. Mendoza v. Ruesga, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610, 616-17 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (noting that the
unclean hands doctrine is a principle of fairness that protects the plaintiff and also protects the court
from having its power used to bring about an inequitable result); Monetary Funding Grp. v.
Pluchino, 867 A.2d 841, 846 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005) (extending the unclean hands doctrine beyond
protecting the defendant to the protection of the court and the advancement of justice-its
application is in the broad discretion of the court).
92. See Yam v. Hamburger Law Firm, LLC, No. RDB-12-3096, 2013 WL 5375462, at *10
(D. Md. 2013); Epstein, 915 So. 2d at 1275 (noting that because a court of equity is a court of
conscience, it demands fair dealing by one who seeks equitable relief, so the rule applies to all
unrighteous conduct and is not confined to fraud or illegality); Rose v. Nat'I Auction Grp., 646
N.W.2d 455, 461 (Mich. 2002) (noting that the unclean hands doctrine "'closes the doors of a court
of equity to one tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter in which he seeks
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denied relief on the grounds of unclean hands, the wrong must be
directly related to the litigation or the transaction on which the claim was
based, and the defendant must have been harmed by the plaintiffs
improper conduct.93
The unclean hands doctrine is narrower than the ex turpi causa
principle in that, traditionally at least, it applies only where the relief
sought by the plaintiff is equitable, not legal. Although the demarcation
between law and equity is in an advanced stage of deterioration, some
courts continue to confine the unclean hands doctrine to equitable
relief.94 Other courts are not so wedded to the crumbling division
between law and equity and no longer confine the unclean hands
doctrine to suits in equity. 95 This is more in accord with the approach to

relief, however improper may have been the behavior of the defendant' (quoting Stachnik v.
Winkel, 230 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Mich. 1975)); Quick v. Samp, 697 N.W.2d 741, 747 (S.D. 2005)
(noting that the unclean hands doctrine is broader than the in paridelicto rule and applies not only
where the plaintiff has been guilty of illegal conduct, but in any situation in which the plaintiffs
conduct in the transaction or litigation is inequitable); O.F. Jones, III v. Whatley, No. 13-09-00355CV, 2011 WL 2405789, at *3 (Tex. App. 2011); T. Leigh Anenson, Beyond Chafee: A ProcessedBased Theory of Unclean Hands, 45 AM. Bus. L.J. 509, 566-68 (2010) (stating that while the
preservation of the integrity of the justice system is a predominant goal of the unclean hands
doctrine, it differs from the in pari delicto rule in that it does not call for a balancing of fault or the
parties' participation in a common unlawful scheme); Anenson, supranote 41, at 459-60; Lawrence,
supra note 5, at 674-77.
93. Jones, 2011 WL 2405789, at *3.
94. PacifiCorp v. Nw. Pipeline GP, 879 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1210 (D. Or. 2012) (noting that
although the in pari delicto rule may be used in relation to claims at law, the unclean hands doctrine
is confined to equitable suits); Monetary Funding Grp., 867 A.2d at 846-47 (applying the
unclean hands doctrine to bar an equitable foreclosure suit because the plaintiff acted improperly
and unfairly in relation to the mortgage, but the court declined to say whether the plaintiff would
have fared better had he sued in law for repayment of the mortgage debt); Epstein, 915 So. 2d at
175-76 (applying the unclean hands doctrine in refusing to grant an equitable lien to the plaintiff
who had colluded in a deception, but it allowed him a money judgment on the basis that the unclean
hands doctrine did not bar that legal remedy); Yarn, 2013 WL 5375462, at *10 (noting while the
unclean hands doctrine applies in cases at equity, in pari delicto is a general rule applicable in law
and equity).
95. See Mendoza, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 616-17 (stating that unclean hands is a defense in both legal
and equitable suits because it is motivated by refusing relief on principles of fairness). The merger
of courts of law and equity began in the United States by the adoption of the Field Code of 1848
in New York, which spread gradually to the federal system and most states. Anenson, supra
note 41, at 456. However, the merger was jurisdictional, not substantive, so the absorption of
equitable principles into legal cases has been more incremental and is still not complete. Id. at 46569. Anenson lists the states in which courts have recognized the unclean hands doctrine in actions at
law. Id. at 467-69. He suggests that in some cases, where courts have allowed the defense in a legal
action without discussion, the court may simply not have been aware of the equitable origins of the
doctrine. Id. at 480; see also Lawrence, supra note 92, at 679-82 (stating that the merger of legal
and equitable jurisdiction justifies the application of the unclean hands doctrine in suits at law).
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the in pari delicto rule, which, as noted earlier, courts apply equally to
equitable and legal claims. 96
Where the plaintiffs conduct is inequitable but lawful, the unclean
hands doctrine occupies a different realm from the in pari delicto rule.
However, the unclean hands doctrine is sometimes raised by a defendant
where the plaintiffs hands have been soiled by illegal conduct in which
the defendant played some role. 97 In that situation, there is some
confusion over the relationship between the unclean hands doctrine and
the in pari delicto rule. A number of courts have equated the two
doctrines and have treated them as indistinguishable where the defendant
has been complicit in the illegality, recognizing that they have in
common the underlying goals of protecting the court's dignity and
furthering public policy." Even if the doctrines are not exactly
equivalent, the need to take into account the defendant's wrongdoing is
indisputable. The goals of equity would not be served if courts applied
the unclean hands doctrine with a blinkered focus on the plaintiffs
wrongful conduct in disregard of any impropriety on the defendant's
part. Equity is not done by barring the claim of a plaintiff against a
defendant who is as much or more to blame for the illegality, so the in
pari delicto rule, with its full balance of the factors discussed in Part III,
should operate to soften the absolute bar of the unclean hands doctrine.99
96.

See supra note 41 and accompanying text.

97. See supranote 90 and accompanying text.
98. See Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 632 (1988) (describing the in pari delicto rule as
"closely analogous" to the unclean hands doctrine); see also Bailey v. Titlemax of Ga., Inc., 776
F.3d 797, 801 (11th Cir. 2015) (noting that in pari delicto and unclean hands are similar and each
requires a plaintiff to come to equity with clean hands); Schlueter v. Latek, 683 F.3d 350, 355 (7th
Cir. 2012) (noting that where the plaintiff is asking for equitable relief, the in pari delicto defense is
referred to as the clean hands defense, but the label doesn't matter); C&S Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v.
Delano, No. 11-37711-B-7, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 4258, at *13 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2014) (stating that
contemporary courts have expanded the in pari delicto defense to situations closely analogous to
unclean hands, so that in pari delicto is just part of the unclean hands doctrine); PacifiCorp,879 F.
Supp. at 1210 (noting that the in pari delicto defense is interchangeable with the unclean hands
defense, but while unclean hands is an equitable defense, in pari delicto is available in suits at law);
Joint Equity Comm. v. Genovese, No. G048238, 2014 WL 4162318, at *3-4 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 22,
2014) (stating that the in pari delicto rule is an "unclean hands defense" and further conflated the
doctrines by stating that negligent or inequitable conduct was sufficient for the in pari delicto
defense, which di& not require a showing of illegality); Cole v. Mitchell, 73 So. 3d 452, 457 (La. Ct.
App. 2011) (describing the in pari delicto rule as a "corollary of the 'unclean hands doctrine'
(citation omitted)); Anenson, supranote 41, at 482-83.
99. See Ground Control LLC v. Capsco Indus., Inc., 120 So. 3d 365, 369-71 (Miss. 2013)
(holding that the plaintiffs claim was not barred under the unclean hands doctrine where both the
plaintiff and the defendant had violated the law and the defendant's conduct was more egregious
than the plaintiffs); Furman v. Furman, 34 N.Y.S.2d 699, 704-05 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (holding that the
court will not use the unclean hands doctrine to bar relief where the plaintiff is less guilty than the
defendant-this would be a greater offense to public morals); Quick v. Samp, 697 N.W.2d 741, 747
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THE BALANCING PROCESS UNDER THE INPARIDELICTO RULE

Having completed an overview of the rationale, concept, and scope
of the in pari delicto rule, this Part examines the manner in which
courts seek to balance the myriad, and sometimes conflicting,
considerations that lead to the decision of whether or not the plaintiffs
claim should be barred. 100 These considerations fall into four categories:
the nature of the remedy sought, the relative guilt of the parties, public
policy and public interest, and the equities between the parties.01 As the
discussion shows, public policy and the public interest come to the
forefront as the crucial determinants.1 02
A.

The Overall Approach to Balancing

As stated before, although the in pari delicto maxim focuses on
equal guilt, the parties' relative responsibility for the illegal action is
only one of the factors that courts take into account in deciding whether
the plaintiff should be denied relief. 03 Some courts appear to follow the
plain language of the maxim and place particular emphasis on relative
guilt. They articulate a two-stage approach to applying the rule in which
the relative guilt of the parties is foundational and other factors are not
even reached unless the plaintiffs guilt equals or exceeds the

(S.D. 2005) (invoking both the unclean hands doctrine and the in pari delicto rule in barring the
plaintiff from suing his attorney for malpractice arising out of the use of a forged document where
the plaintiff knew of the forgery).
100. See infra Part III.
101. See infra Part III.B-E.
102. See infra Part III.D.
103. Both the Restatement of Contracts, published in 1932, and the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts,published in 1981, articulate the various considerations that should be taken into account
in deciding whether or not to enforce an illegal contract. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 598-609
(AM. LAW INST. 1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 178, 183, 197-99 (AM. LAW
INST. 1981). The Restatement of Contracts, sections 598 to 609 do not mention expressly the in pari
delicto rule, but they do recognize that comparative guilt is a consideration in deciding whether to
grant relief and set out other considerations that a court should take into account in deciding
whether to bar enforcement, or restitution, or both. The Restatement (Second) of Contractsmakes it
clear that the decision on whether to enforce an illegal contract is complex and dependent on the
weighing of many factors listed in section 178. These include the justified expectations of the
parties, the forfeiture that would result from a denial of enforcement, the seriousness of the
infraction, and the public interest in favor of enforcement. Id. § 178(2). Comment b to section 178
suggests that in cases of doubt, the balance should tilt in favor of enforcement, and that enforcement
should be refused "only if the factors that argue against enforcement clearly outweigh the law's
traditional interest in protecting the expectation of the parties, its abhorrence of any unjust
enrichment, and any public interest in the enforcement of the particular term." Id. § 178 cmt. b.
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defendant's.1" If this approach is followed strictly, a determination that
the plaintiff did not bear equal or greater responsibility for the illegal
conduct ends the inquiry and the in pari delicto defense fails. However,
even courts that articulate a two-stage approach do not actually end
their analysis after concluding that the plaintiff was less guilty than
the defendant but proceed to weigh the other considerations."os Others
do not even see the question of relative guilt as foundational,
but rather treat it as one of the factors to be weighed in the overall
balance, commingling the discussion of relative guilt with the
other considerations, such as the nature of the relief sought, the
impact and severity of the violation of the law, the equities between
the parties, and the public policy and public interest implications
of the decision. They address the policy implications of allowing or
refusing relief, whether or not the plaintiff was guiltier, as guilty, or
less guilty than the defendant. 106
104. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 635-36 (1988) (explaining that refusal of relief is only
justified where the plaintiff was an active, voluntary participant in the illegal activity, and violated
the law in cooperation with the defendant, so that the plaintiff bears substantially equal
responsibility for the illegality); Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 30607, 310-11 (1985) (holding that the in pari delicto defense should be limited to situations in which
the plaintiff truly bore at least substantially equal responsibility for his injury); Lamonica v. Safe
Hurricane Shutters, Inc., 711 F.3d 1299, 1308-09 (1Ith Cir. 2013) (holding that because the plaintiff
was not in equal guilt with the defendant, the court need not proceed to policy analysis); Rogers v.
McDorman, 521 F.3d 381, 389-90 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that the in pari delicto defense is
appropriate to preclude suit by one equally guilty party against another); Official Comm. of
Unsecured Creditors of PSA, Inc. v. Edwards, 437 F.3d 1145, 1153-54 (1lth Cir. 2006); Bash v.
Textron Fin. Corp., 483 B.R. 630, 650 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (opining that the defendant must establish
that the plaintiff is at least equally guilty); Orzel ex rel. Orzel v. Scott Drug Co., 537 N.W.2d 208,
217 (Mich. 1995) (explaining that the plaintiff may recover if the defendant's culpability is greater
than the plaintiffs); MCA Fin. Corp. v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 687 N.W.2d 850, 854-55 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2004) (holding that the in pari delicto defense was available where the plaintiffs guilt
exceeded the defendants'); Teneyck, Inc. v. Rosenberg, 957 N.Y.S.2d 845, 848 (Sup. Ct. 2013)
(holding that a defendant who is more at fault than the plaintiff cannot use the in pari delicto
defense); Furman v. Furman, 34 N.Y.S.2d 699, 704-05 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (deciding that the court will
grant relief to the less guilty of the parties); Feld & Sons, Inc. v. Pechner, Dorfman, Wolfee,
Rounick & Cabot, 458 A.2d 545, 553-54 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1983) (using a two-step approach in which
relative guilt is determined first, followed by a determination of whether public policy is best served
by denying or allowing relief); Small, III v. Parker Healthcare Mgmt. Org., No. 05-11-01471-CV,
2013 WL 5827822, at *4-5 (Tex. App. Oct. 29, 2013) (determining that the rule that the court will
not entertain an illegal transaction may not apply where the plaintiff is less culpable).
105. This is most strikingly demonstrated by the approach of the U.S. Supreme Court. See
Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 315-17 (engaging in policy analysis despite holding that the in pari
delicto rule should apply only where the plaintiff bears substantially equal responsibility for the
violation of the law, and finding that the plaintiffs were less guilty than the defendants); Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1968) (conducting policy analysis after
holding that the plaintiffs were less guilty than the defendants).
106. O'Hara v. Ahlgren Blumenfeld & Kempster, 537 N.E.2d 730, 737-38 (Ill. 1989) (holding
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It is therefore important to understand that even though the maxim
itself and some courts seem to emphasize the importance of relative
guilt, courts are not likely to make a decision based on that factor alone,
but will conduct a comprehensive evaluation of all relevant factors,
which are usually interrelated and not easily separated or viewed in
isolation. Indeed, the very question of relative guilt is sometimes
dependent on or influenced by the policy underlying the violated law
and the public interest.
B.

The Role of the ClaimedRemedy in the BalancingProcess:
The DistinctionBetween Enforcement and Restitution

Taken literally, the ex turpi causa and the in pari delicto maxims
preclude all relief to a plaintiff whose claim arises out of illegal action
for which he bears equal or greater responsibility.' At face value, the
maxims make no distinction between the enforcement of rights arising
out of the transaction and the restitution of any benefit that the plaintiff
may have conferred on the defendant during the course of performing
the transaction. 08 Nevertheless, there is a significant distinction between
enforcement and restitution. The enforcement of rights deriving from the
illegal transaction recognizes the legal efficacy of that transaction. 0 9
However, the plaintiffs restitutionary claim is based on disaffirmance of
that even if the parties are not in pari delicto, the court may not enforce an agreement because the
public interest is of "determining importance"); Shimack v. Garcia Mendoza, 912 P.2d 822, 825-26
(Nev. 1996) (holding that although the plaintiff, an investigator, was less guilty than the defendant,
an attorney, in entering a fee-splitting arrangement, the court still analyzed the equities between the
parties and the public interest before concluding that the plaintiffs suit could proceed); Goldberg v.
Sanglier, 639 P.2d 1347, 1353 (Wash. 1982) (holding that where the conduct of a party who raises
the in pari delicto defense "outrages public sensibilities" more than the conduct of the plaintiff, the
court will not allow the defense, but the application of the doctrine is based, ultimately, on public
policy considerations, and not on a "neat calculus for determining differential fault"); Marte v.
Hernandez, No. 66664-9-1, 2011 WL 1833827, at *7-8 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (showing that
although the court found the parties to be in equal guilt, it indicated that even if the plaintiff had not
been found to be equally guilty, the court would conduct a policy analysis to decide if enforcement
would be in the public interest). In some cases, the court has allowed the in pari delicto defense and
refused relief to the less guilty plaintiff on public policy grounds. See, e.g., O'Hara, 537 N.E.2d at
737-38 (refusing to enforce a fee-splitting arrangement on public policy grounds, even though it
found that the defendant attorney was more guilty than the plaintiff).
107. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
108. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts enunciates the general rule that illegality precludes
all relief, including restitution. Comment a to section 197 notes that this is in accord with the
principle that the court will simply leave the parties to an illegal contract as it finds them.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

109.

§

197 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981).

Kevin H. Michels, The Corporate Attorney as "Internal" Gatekeeper and the In Pari

Delicto Defense: A ProposedNew Standard, 4 ST. MARY'S J. ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS

318, 335 (2014).
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the transaction and restoration of the defendant's unjust enrichment,
which implicates no judicial recognition of the validity of the
0 In fact, restitution, by placing
transaction.o"
the parties in the status quo
ante, may be the closest a court can come to making a neutral decision
that undoes, rather than recognizes, the transaction."' In addition, the
unjust enrichment of the wrongdoing defendant is not an appealing
result. Therefore, as a matter of principle, courts should not apply
absolutely the apparent universal bar to remedy suggested by the in pari
delicto rule, but should distinguish restitution from enforcement.
While some courts do articulate the distinction between restitution
and enforcement, it is hard to discern any kind of universal or consistent
approach, or to assert that courts have established a clear principle that
restitutionary claims should be treated differently from claims that call
for the enforcement of rights arising from the illegal transaction." 2
Courts are most likely to grant restitution to the wrongdoing plaintiff
where there is a statute that specifically provides for that remedy." In
the absence of a clear statutory recognition of the plaintiffs right to
restitution, the nature of the remedy sought becomes just one of the
many considerations that courts weigh in the overall balance, and to
some courts, the unjust enrichment of the defendant is not in itself
enough to tip the scales where the plaintiff was equally or more guilty
than the defendant.' 14
110. See Stewart v. Wright, 147 F. 321, 334 (8th Cir. 1906). In claiming restitution of money
advanced by the plaintiff to the defendant in furtherance of a fraudulent gambling scheme, the
plaintiff "does not ask the court to recognize the propriety of his transaction or to award him any
portion of the plunder. He proceeds not in affirmance or reliance, but wholly by way of repudiation,
and seeks merely ... what was illegally taken from him by fraud and false pretense." Id.
I11. In Feld & Sons, Inc. v. Pechner, Dorfnan, Wolfee, Rounick, and Cabot, the court refused
to allow a client to claim damages for malpractice from an attomey, where the attorney had
counselled the client to commit perjury and falsify evidence. 458 A.2d 545, 551-53 (Pa. Sup. Ct.
1983). However, it did allow the client to seek disgorgement of the fees paid to the attorney on the
basis that restitution comes as close as possible to not aiding either party. Id at 554.
112. See Collen P. Murphy, Misclassifting Monetary Restitution, 55 SMU L. REv. 1577, 158995 (2002) (describing the difference between restitution and enforcement).
113. See, e.g., Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 637-39 (1988) (determining that the Securities Act
permits the purchaser of an unregistered security to sue the seller for restitution, and the court must
follow the statutory policy of allowing restitution so as to further the statutory goal of encouraging
private remedies to enhance enforcement of the statute).

114. Gamboa v. Alvarado, 941 N.E.2d 1012, 1017 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (determining that
restitution is an appropriate remedy where the plaintiff was not in pari delicto with the defendant);
Sw. Underground Supply & Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Amerivac, Inc., 894 S.W.2d 15, 18 (Tex. App.
1994) (permitting quantum meruit recovery for the value of work performed where the plaintiff had
entered the illegal contract under duress and was therefore less guilty than the defendant); Goldberg
v. Sanglier, 639 P.2d 1347, 1354-55 (Wash. 1982) (allowing restitution and a disgorgement of
profits to plaintiffs who were not in pari delicto with the defendants); Marte v. Hernandez, No.
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Yet, there are some circumstances in which there is a softening of
the approach to the restitutionary claim of an equally or more guilty
plaintiff: true repentance, where the plaintiff withdraws from the
transaction of his own accord, may make the court more amenable to the
plaintiffs restitutionary claim."'s Courts have also recognized that in
some circumstances, the defendant's gain is so galling, and the
plaintiffs forfeiture is so unfair that restitution best serves the equities
and public policy."' Of course, a forfeiture of rights is inevitable
where a remedy is refused, so courts that allow restitution on grounds of
unfair forfeiture usually require some compelling demonstration of
hardship."' Unfairness is an elusive concept, dependent on the
circumstances of the case, the perceptions of the judge,"' and the totality
of the circumstances."19
The nature of the restitutionary claim also has a bearing on the
court's willingness to grant restitution, even if it would not enforce the
transaction. A straightforward claim for the restoration of property or
money given to the defendant is very different from a claim in quantum
meruit for the market value of the performance that the plaintiff has
rendered. Because the agreed price of performance is often based on or
66664-9-1, 2011 WL 1833827, at *8-9 (Wash. Ct. App. May 16, 2011) (holding that because the
plaintiff was a willing participant in the fraud perpetrated against a third party, he was not entitled
either to enforce the contract or to receive restitution of value paid to the defendant under it);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 198(b), cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (stating that
restitution is an appropriate remedy where the plaintiff was not in pari delicto with the defendant).
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 199(a) (stating that a party should be allowed
restitution if she did not engage in serious misconduct and repented by withdrawing from the
transaction before its illegal purpose was achieved); FARNSWORTH, supra note 51, § 5.9(D), at 350;
Grodecki, supra note 31, at 261 (explaining that in the eighteenth century, English courts developed
the qualification that the in pari delicto rule should not be applied where the contract was executory
and the plaintiff repented, terminated the transaction, and sought restitution).
116. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(2)(b) (recognizing that one of the
factors to be considered in deciding whether to refuse enforcement is "any forfeiture that would
result if enforcement is denied"); id. § 197 (recognizing that a court may permit restitution where its
denial would result in "disproportionate forfeiture"); id. § 197 cmt. b (explaining that the exception
is intended to be narrow, and should only apply where the loss is disproportionate in relation to the
violation of the law, and the plaintiff has committed a relatively harmless violation of technical
rules); see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 51, § 5.9(D), at 348-49.
117. See, e.g., Taylor v. AIA Servs. Corp., 261 P.3d 829, 844 (Idaho 2011) (holding that the
plaintiff did not show that refusal of enforcement would be unduly harsh merely because the
plaintiff would be deprived of the benefit of his bargain).
118. See Wade, supra note 4, at 53-55, 60 (determining that the court's response to a claim of
restitution is probably emotional and depends on whether the court is more impressed by the
defendant's unjust enrichment or the plaintiff s effort to curtail the loss from his illegal transaction).
119. See, e.g., Juliet P. Kostritsky, Illegal Contracts and Efficient Deterrence: A Study in
Modern Contract Theory, 74 IOWA L. REv. 115, 154 (1988) (noting that unfair forfeiture is more
likely to be found where the plaintiff was less sophisticated and knowledgeable than the defendant).
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equivalent to the market value of that performance, there may in fact be
no economic difference in enforcement of the transaction and a claim in
quantum meruit for the value of services. If that is so, a court may balk
at allowing restitution where the quantum meruit claim is just a back
door to enforcement of the contract. 120
In short, there is no clear doctrinal rule that distinguishes restitution
from enforcement and makes it easier for a plaintiff who seeks only
restitution to resist the in pari delicto defense. The maxims fail to make
any distinction between restitution and enforcement and encourage the
premise that the nature of the remedy makes no difference. Although
some courts have recognized that restitutionary claims should be
evaluated more sympathetically, one cannot say that this is a clear and
generally applied principle.1 2 ' It should be, though. It is crucial to a
principled and coherent application of the in pari delicto rule that courts
recognize that the nature of the remedy sought is a significant
consideration in the decision on whether to apply the in paridelicto rule.
C.

Relative Guilt

Even where the parties knowingly and voluntarily collaborate in an
illegal transaction, the determination of relative fault and the assignment
of the degree of blame to each of the parties can be difficult because
it is very much dependent on the facts of each case, the nature and
purpose of the law that has been violated, and the personal attributes
of the parties. However, the balance of guilt does not need to be
precisely calibrated-it is enough to show that the parties' degree of
fault is indistinguishable.1 22
Where there is no clear basis for tipping the balance of guilt one
way or another, a court may simply disregard this factor and resort to
policy to determine which party should be treated as more guilty. 2 1
120. Ground Control, LLC v. Capsco Indus., Inc., 120 So. 3d 365, 371 (Miss. 2013) (allowing
an unlicensed sub-subcontractor to recover in quantum meruit); id. at 375-76 (Randolph, J.,
dissenting) (considering that allowing the sub-subcontractor to recover in quantum meruit was
tantamount to allowing it to enforce the contract); id. at 376-77 (Coleman, J., dissenting) (same);
Sw. Underground Supply & Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Amerivac, Inc., 894 S.W.2d 15, 17-19 (Tex. App.
1994) (allowing quantum meruit recovery for the value of work, but only because the plaintiff was
less guilty than the defendant).
121. See Wade, supra note 4, at 4l-44, 53-55.
122. Flaxer v. Gifford, 528 B.R. 598, 611-13 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (holding that where the
defendant deliberately engaged in fraud in the course of his employment, he could assert the in pari
delicto defense against his equally guilty employer, which sanctioned the fraud); Quick v. Samp,
697 N.W.2d 741, 745-46 (S.D. 2005) (deciding that the court need not measure equality of fault
exactly-all that need be shown is that the plaintiff is at least as guilty as the defendant).
123. For example, in Skinner v. E.F. Hutton Co., the plaintiff had acted on insider information

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2016

27

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 9

808

HOFSTRA LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 44:781

Courts have identified a number of situations that strongly indicate
where greater blame should be placed. First, where the law is intended to
apply to only one of the parties, that party bears greater responsibility for
its violation.12 4 Second, the attributes, state of mind, motives,
dominance, sophistication, responsibilities, duties, or expertise of one of
the parties may make that party more blameworthy or may impose on
him a stronger duty to obey the law. Therefore, for example, the fact that
one of the parties was the ringleader or initiator of the illegal scheme
may make him more guilty than his cohort.' 25 Third, one of the parties
may have been justifiably ignorant of the circumstances that made the
transaction illegal and, may therefore, be less blameworthy than the
party who knew these circumstances.1 2 6 Fourth, a power imbalance
between the parties may enable the dominant party to influence or
coerce the weaker party to participate in the illegal action. 2 7 Fifth,
in buying and retaining stock that failed to appreciate as expected. 333 S.E.2d 236, 237 (N.C. 1985).
Both the plaintiff (the tippee) and the defendant (the tipper) had violated securities laws in trading
on insider information. Id. at 238-39. On being sued by the tippee for compensatory and punitive
damages, the tipper raised the in paridelicto defense. Id. at 237-38. The court refused to attempt to
determine the relative guilt of the parties on the basis that the determination was too unreliable and
unpredictable. Id. at 238-39. Instead, it decided, as a matter of policy, that the purposes of
insider trading laws is best served by creating a per se rule that a tipper's guilt exceeds that
of the tippee. Id. The court was dealing with a violation of state securities law, so it was not bound
by Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, and declined to follow it. Id. at 240 (citing
Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Bemer, 472 U.S. 299 (1985)). While the certainty of a per se
rule is comforting, there may be some situations in which an analysis of the circumstances of the
case would lead to the conclusion that the tippee did in fact bear greater responsibility for the
violation of the law.
124. See, e.g., Schlueter v. Latek, 683 F.3d 350, 355-56 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding a licensing
statute was applicable only to a broker, and not to his customer, so the parties could not be in
equal guilt).
125. However, if the cohort was an active participant in the ringleader's scheme, a court may
find equal guilt. For example, in Marte v. Hernandez, two brothers entered into a partnership to
acquire a McDonalds franchise. No. 66664-9-1, 2011 WL 1833827, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. May 16,
2011). They knew that McDonalds would not grant the franchise to a partnership, and so, they
concealed it, committing a fraud on McDonalds. Id. Although the brother who was the franchisee of
record made the misrepresentation, the court held that the brother who was the undisclosed partner
could not sue the franchisee's estate for his partnership interest. Id. at *7-8. As an active participant
in the scheme, he was barred from recovery by the in paridelicto defense. Id
126. Taylor v. AIA Servs. Corp., 261 P.3d 829, 842-43 (Idaho 2011) (holding that while
ignorance of the law is no excuse, the parties are not in equal guilt if the one party is justifiably
ignorant of the circumstances that made the transaction illegal). But see Small v. Parker Healthcare
Mgmt. Org., No. 05-11-01471-CV, 2013 WL 5827822, at *5 (Tex. App. Oct. 29, 2013) (holding
that because both parties operated under a mistaken belief as to the legality of the transaction, they
were in equal guilt, even though the belief was based on legal advice); Geis v. Colina Del Rio, LP,
326 S.W.3d 100, 108-09 (Tex. App. 2011) (holding when only one of the parties had access to facts
that made the transaction illegal, the other party is not in paridelicto).
127. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1968) (finding
muffler dealers who engaged in a conspiracy to restrain trade were not in pari delicto with the
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where the parties are equally guilty in the transaction itself, the balance
of guilt may be tipped by the conduct of one of the parties beyond the
shared illegal purpose (for example, one of the parties may have induced
the other to enter an illegal transaction by making a fraudulent
misrepresentation to the other).' 28 Sixth, where one of the parties is a
professional such as a lawyer or an accountant, her professional duties
may impose greater responsibility on her and may also allow her to
influence the other party more easily. Professional duties of competence
and honesty often place professionals such as lawyers and accountants in
the position of being the more guilty party if they enter into transactions
that violate both the law and their professional responsibilities1 2 9 or if
franchisor because they had little bargaining power agaipst the franchisor); Tamposi v. Denby, 974
F. Supp. 2d 51, 57-58 (D. Mass. 2013) (determining that where both parties are in pari delicto,
concurring in an illegal act, it does not always follow that their guilt is equal-there may be an
inequality of condition or a confidential relationship between them); Schneider v. Schneider, 644
A.2d 510, 516-17 (Md. 1994) (stating that a wife dominated by her husband may not have been
equally guilty of colluding in perjury to obtain a divorce); Proctor v. Whitlark & Whitlark, Inc., 750
S.E.2d 93, 96 (S.C. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that a power imbalance may arise from addictive or
compulsive behavior, so a habitual gambler who engaged in illegal gambling was not in pari delicto
with the operator of the illegal gambling machines because he was a habitual gambler); Sw.
Underground Supply & Envtl. Servs., Inc.v. Amerivac, Inc., 894 S.W.2d 15, 18 (Tex. App. 1994)
(holding that duress, combined with illegality, precluded enforcement of an illegal non-competition
clause). In Roma Construction Co. v. Russo, a developer who bribed the mayor of a town was not
deprived of a civil claim against the mayor under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 194 (2000), because the mayor extorted the bribes. 96 F.3d
566, 574-75 (1st Cir. 1996). While the case involved the interpretation of RICO, rather than the in
paridelicto rule, the reasoning is analogous.
128. See Stewart v. Wright, 147 F. 321, 325-26 (8th Cir. 1906) (holding that although the
plaintiff knowingly participated in a fraudulent gambling scheme, he was not in pari delicto with a
bank that facilitated the scheme and collaborated in cheating the plaintiff); Berman v. Oakley, 137
N.E. 667, 670-71 (Mass. 1923) (holding that although a client was guilty of trying to suppress a
criminal prosecution, his attorney could not raise the in pari delicto defense against the client
because the attorney had defrauded and manipulated the client in relation to the case). Bateman
Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, involved insider trading under the securities laws. 472 U.S.
299 (1985). The insider information furnished to the investors was false, and the investors sued the
tipsters for losses resulting from the bad investment. Id at 301-02. The court refused to allow the in
pari delicto defense. Id. at 310. Although both parties had violated the law, the plaintiffs (the
investors) were not as guilty as the tipsters, who had deliberately provided misleading and deceptive
information to induce the investment. Id. at 310-11.
129. In Shimrack v. Garcia-Mendoza, a lawyer entered into a fee-splitting arrangement with
the plaintiff, a non-lawyer, in contravention of the rules of professional responsibility. 912 P.2d 822,
823-24 (Nev. 1996). Although the plaintiff likely knew this was a violation of the Rules, the court
allowed him to recover the agreed compensation. Id. at 826-27. It was the lawyer, not the plaintiff
who was subject to the Rules, and the lawyer was therefore at greater fault. Id at 826. The court
went on to find that public policy was best served by ensuring that the lawyer was not unjustly
enriched by avoiding payment for the plaintiffs services. Id. In Danzig v. Danzig, a lawyer, in
violation of the rules of professional responsibility, entered into an arrangement to pay a fee to a
runner for directing clients to him. 904 P.2d 312, 313 (Wash. App. 1995). The majority of the court
refused to dismiss the runner's claim on the basis of the in pari delicto rule and allowed him to
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they advise, support, condone, or fail to detect the client's illegal
actions.13 0 However, this is not the inevitable result. Where the client's
conduct is egregious and he deliberately engaged in defiance of the law,
the client's guilt may surpass the lawyer or accountant's fault in
counseling or overlooking the conduct.'"' The question of relative guilt
also depends on the degree of culpability of the professional.
Therefore, an auditor or attorney may succeed in raising the in pari
delicto defense to a claim based on negligent failure to detect
wrongdoing, but would be less successful in raising it where he aided
and abetted the client's illegal conduct.132

proceed to trial to show that he was less guilty than the lawyer and that public policy was best
served by enforcement. Id at 314-16. The dissent would have dismissed the claim on the basis that
it was clear on the pleadings that the runner knew the contract was illegal, and public policy was
best served by creating a disincentive for runners to enter into such contracts. Id. at 316-17
(Thompson, J., dissenting). Where the client acts illegally on the advice of a professional, without
intent to violate the law, the professional should not be able to raise the client's illegality as a
defense. For example, in MF Global Holdings, Inc. v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, LLP, the court
refused to allow auditors to assert the inparidelicto defense where a corporation followed improper
accounting procedures recommended by the auditor, merely acting on the auditor's advice and
without the deliberate intent to break the law. 57 F. Supp. 3d 206, 210-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
130. Shaiman v. Carpet One of Hamptons, Inc., No. BRC 208-08, 2010 WL 2305549, at *5-6
(N.Y. D. Ct. June 9, 2010) (refusing to allow an accountant to raise the in pari delicto defense,
although the client violated the law by underreporting sales taxes because the accountant deviated
from accepted accounting practices by not verifying the client's figures).
131. Choquette v. Isacoff, 836 N.E.2d 329, 334 (Mass. App. 2005) (allowing attorney to raise
the in pari delicto defense, although the client committed perjury on the advice of his attorney,
because the client actually committed the crime); MCA Fin. Corp. v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 687
N.W.2d 850, 854-55 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that accountants for the plaintiff corporation
did not bear equal guilt with the corporation where the accountants merely turned a blind eye to the
fraud of corporate officers); Feld & Sons, Inc. v. Pechner, Dorfna, Wolfee, Rounick, and Cabot,
548 A.2d 545, 548-53 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (holding that a client had no malpractice claim against
his attorney where he committed perjury, falsified exhibits, and bribed a witness on the attomey's
advice-the client knew he was violating the law and was in pari delicto with his attorney); Quick
v. Samp, 697 N.W.2d 741, 747-48 (S.D. 2005) (barring suit by client for malpractice under the in
pari delicto rule where an attorney and client collaborated in the forgery of a document relied upon
in a lawsuit, because he did not act innocently on the attorney's advice, and knew that the
falsification violated the law); Harborview Office Ctr., LLC v. Nash, 804 N.W.2d 829, 833-34
(Wis. Ct. App. 2011) (applying the in pani delicto rule to bar a developer from suing its attorney for
malpractice where the developer illegally and egregiously spoliated evidence relating to defective
work on a building, thereby resulting in dismissal of its suit against a contractor).
132. Stewart v. Wilmington Tr. SP Serv., Inc., 112 A.3d 271, 302, 317 (Del. Ch. 2015), aff'd,
126 A.3d 1115 (Del. 2015) (noting that while a claim based on breach of contract or professional
negligence may be barred by the in pari delicto defense, a claim for aiding and abetting might not
be because the defendant's degree of guilt is greater where he breaches his fiduciary duty).
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Public Policy and the Public Interest

The analysis of public policy and the public interest looms as the
most important factor in the equitable balancing under the in pari delicto
rule. Even where a plaintiff is found to be guiltier of the illegal conduct
than the defendant, the court may be persuaded to allow relief on
grounds of public policy and the public interest.' In the absence
of a clearly-articulated legislative policy determination, the decision
of what result best serves public policy is notoriously difficult
and unpredictable.' 34
Where the transaction violates a statute, the statute may obviate the
need for the court to conduct a public policy analysis by settling the
policy question legislatively. Where the statute speaks clearly on the
effect of a contravention, the court's role is relatively simple-it applies
the statute.' 3 5 The statute may expressly declare that neither party may
sue on a cause of action arising from the violation, or it may declare the
transaction void, which has the same effect, or it may recognize a
remedy in favor of one of the parties, but not the other.' 36 Alternatively,
it may disallow a claim for damages, but may give one or both parties a
claim for restitution of any benefit conferred on the other under the
illegal transaction.' 37 Even if the statute does not specifically articulate
the legal effect of the transaction, it may provide for a private

133. Geis v. Colina Del Rio LP, 362 S.W.3d 100, 108 (Tex. App. 2011) (finding that even if
the parties are in pari delicto, the plaintiff may recover where public policy weighs in favor of
allowing the claim).
134. Richardson v. Mellish (1824) 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303; 5 Co. Rep. 91 (describing public
policy as an unruly horse). This metaphor is still quoted frequently in cases and commentaries to
describe the unpredictable and slippery nature of public policy analysis in dealing with illegal
contracts. See Kojo Yelpaala, Restraining the Unruly Horse: The Use of Public Policy in
Arbitration,Interstate and InternationalConflict of Laws in California,2 TRANSNAT'L L. 379, 38083 (1989).
135. Orzel ex rel. Orzel v. Scott Drug Co., 537 N.W.2d 208, 218 (Mich. 1995) (finding that
where the statute expressly allows the plaintiff to recover, the court will simply permit the cause of
action).
136. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 623 (1988) (describing securities law as providing a remedy
to the purchaser of an unregistered security); Gamboa v. Albarado, 941 N.E.2d 1012, 1017-18 (111.
App. Ct. 2011) (describing an immigration statute as designed to protect persons in the position of
the plaintiffs and to provide them with a private right of enforcement to recover injunctive or
compensatory relief).
137. Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Price, 105 F. Supp. 2d 46, 53 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)
(allowing the recovery of gambling losses under a state law designed to protect gamblers); Proctor
v. Whitlark & Whitlark, Inc., 750 S.E.2d 93, 96 (S.C. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that the purpose of a
statute prohibiting gambling on video poker machines was to protect compulsive gamblers and their
families, so that it was appropriate to grant a restitutionary remedy to the plaintiff gambler).
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enforcement remedy, which may signify legislative intent not to bar
relief, or at least not to bar all forms of relief. 38
Sometimes, the statute's unstated but apparent goals may provide
an indication of the proper disposition of the plaintiffs claim."' Some
statutes that do not specifically address remedy have the clear purpose of
protecting one class of parties against the other-usually a party who is
vulnerable to being victimized by the other. Although the parties may
138. See Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 315-16 (1985) (barring
the in pari delicto defense by defendant stock brokers and allowing plaintiffs to sue for damages
because private litigation was an important means of exposing and deterring the proscribed
conduct); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc., v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138-39 (1968) (holding that
muffler dealers who had engaged in a conspiracy with the franchisor to restrain trade were not
barred from suing the franchisor under the antitrust laws because private enforcement suits under
the antitrust laws are an important adjunct to government enforcement action); Gatt Commc'ns v.
PMC Assocs., LLC, 711 F.3d 68, 80-81 (2d Cir. 2013) (explaining how the policy of allowing
private enforcement actions under the antitrust laws must be weighed against the concern of
rewarding a plaintiff that was completely and continually involved in a monopolization scheme);
Carter v. Cohen, 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 303,310-11, 315 (Ct. App. 2010) (allowing a tenant's claim for
disgorgement of rent paid in excess of the rent permitted by regulation because the ordinance
allowed the tenant to recover excess rent payments plus treble damages and attorney's fees); The
Diversified Group, Inc. v. Sahn, 696 N.Y.S.2d 133, 137 (App. Div. 1999) (holding that the in pari
delicto rule did not bar the plaintiffs claim for a refund of money paid for illegally-scalped tickets
because the anti-scalping statute provided for a private right of action to buyers, even if the buyer
knew that the transaction was illegal); cf Rogers v. McDorman, 521 F.3d 381, 387-89 (11th Cir.
2008) (explaining that the in pari delicto defense is consistent with RICO policy goals, which do not
call for one guilty violator to recover from another); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of
PSA, Inc. v. Edwards, 437 F.3d 1145, 1152-56 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that the inparidelictorule
precludes a corporation whose officers engaged in a Ponzi scheme from recovering statutory
damages against custodians of IRA accounts that ignored or failed to detect the fraud because it
would be anomalous to award those damages to a party who violated the statute). In Republic of
Iraq v. ABB AG, the post-Hussein Republic brought a RICO claim to recover losses from those who
had collaborated with the Hussein regime in illegally diverting funds from the "Oil for Food"
program. 768 F.3d 145, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 2836 (2015). The majority
upheld the in pari delicto defense on the grounds that Hussein's illegal actions were imputed to the
Republic, which must therefore be treated as an unlawful actor, and thus, it was precluded from
claiming under RICO, which contemplated damages only to an innocent victim and not to a party
that conspired in the racketeering activity, even if only by imputation. Id. at 167-68. The dissent
argued that there would be no violation of RICO policy where the plaintiff was not the actual
wrongdoer, but was in fact seeking relief on behalf of victims of the conspiracy. Id. at 181-82
(Droney, J., dissenting).
139. See Pinter, 486 U.S. at 634-35, 641, 647, 650 (showing that where the statute is unclear
on the impact of illegality on the transaction, it has not abrogated the common law in pari delicto
rule); MGM Constr. Serv. Corp. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of America, 57 So. 3d 884, 885-86,
888, 891 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (showing when a municipal code provided penalties for
performing unlicensed building work, but did not indicate the effect of noncompliance on a suit for
the price of that work by an unlicensed contractor, the court must decide this question, taking into
account the statutory purpose, the public interest, and the equities between the parties); Taylor v.
AIA Serv. Corp., 261 P.3d 829, 844 (Idaho 2011) (finding that where the agreement-a stock
repurchase financed other than out of the corporation's earned surplus-was exactly the kind of
contract that was prohibited by the statute, non-enforcement best serves the policy of the statute).
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have collaborated in entering the illegal transaction, the statutory
purpose may best be served by allowing suit by the plaintiff if he falls
within the class intended to be protected.14 0 The question of whether the
plaintiff falls within the protected class is a matter of interpretation.14
The intent to protect one class of party against the other may be apparent
from the obvious purpose of the statute, or if not, may be gleaned from
other indicia, such as the imposition of a penalty for violation on only
one class of party, 142 or the requirement that one party has to follow
prescribed procedures that would have the effect of protecting members
of the public who enter into transactions covered by the statute.14 1
140. Bailey v. Titlemax of Georgia, Inc., 776 F.3d 797, 801-02, 804-05 (11th Cir. 2015)
(holding that the Fair Labor Standards Act is intended to protect an employee's right to overtime
pay, so the employer cannot assert the in pari delicto defense to a claim for unpaid overtime, even
though the employee collaborated in underreporting his overtime hours); Karpenko v. Leendertz,
619 F.3d 259, 265-66 (3d Cir. 2010) (denying the defense of unclean hands to a claim for child
custody under the Hague Convention where the purpose of the Convention was to protect the best
interests of the child); In re Singh, No. 10-42050-D-7, 2015 WL 1887939, at *4-6 (Bank. E.D. Cal.
Apr. 22, 2015) (showing that although a usury statute is intended to protect borrowers from paying
excessive interest, its protection is confined to borrowers who did nothing more than pay usurious
interest, and cannot be used to overcome the in pari delicto defense where the borrower deliberately
offered to pay usurious interest to support a Ponzi scheme); Carter, 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 310-11
(holding that a tenant's claim for disgorgement of rent paid in excess of the rent permitted by
regulation is consistent with statutory policy and should not be barred); Bodily v. Piedmont Vill.
Green Home Owners Assoc. Inc., 163 Cal. Rptr. 658, 663 (Ct. App. 1980) (holding that the
homeowner's association could sue under a contract that violated a law relating to the subdivision of
land because the statute was meant to protect homeowners who purchase subdivided real property
from a developer who has made the subdivision); Schneider v. Schneider, 644 A.2d 510, 517-18
(Md. 1994) (holding a statute providing for the enforcement of a spousal support obligation evinces
a strong policy of protecting the creditor spouse, which outweighs that spouse's collusion with the
debtor spouse in perjury relating to the divorce); Orzel, 537 N.W.2d at 218-19 (holding that the
plaintiff did not fall within the class of persons intended to be protected by the statute and had, in
fact, undermined the statutory purpose); MCA Fin. Corp. v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 687 N.W.2d 850,
856-57 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (explaining where there is a basis in a statute for finding that it was
intended to protect a class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member, a court may permit a
remedy); Parsky Funeral Home, Inc. v. Shapiro, 372 N.Y.S.2d 288, 291-92, 294 (Civ. Ct. 1975)
(holding that because a statute requiring the disclosure of funeral costs was aimed at protecting
customers of funeral homes, a funeral home that failed to comply with the statute could not sue its
customer); Geis v. Colina Del Rio LP, 362 S.W.3d 100, 109-10 (Tex. App. 2011) (holding that a
statute requiring architects to be licensed was meant to protect users of architectural services, so the
public interest is best served by allowing the client to sue the architect).
141. See Ryan v. Motor Credit Co., 28 A.2d 181, 182-83 (N.J. 1942) (holding that the purpose
of a statute prohibiting usury was to protect only consumer borrowers from oppression, so a car
dealer was not in the protected class and was in paridelicto because he knowingly and voluntarily
agreed to the interest rate).
142. Suburban Home Mortg. v. Hopwood, 73 N.E.2d 519, 520 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947)
(discussing where a statute imposes a penalty on only one of the parties, it is safe to assume that the
other is not in pard delicto).
143. Pinter, 486 U.S. at 637-39 (explaining that the procedure of registration required by the
statute was designed to protect purchasers by providing them with accurate information on which to
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Where a statute neither addresses remedy nor has the apparent
purpose of protecting one class of party, or where the illegality involves
a violation of common law, the court has less guidance in determining
which resolution best furthers public policy. Such cases present a greater
risk that public policy analysis may be arbitrary and dependent on a
particular judge's speculation regarding the impact of the decision on the
public good. Whatever reasoning a court may use to justify its decision
on public policy grounds, there is often an equally-persuasive, or at least
plausible, argument for reaching the opposite conclusion. The elusive
nature of a resolution that best serves the public interest is starkly
illustrated by cases in which the majority and dissent reach opposite
conclusions on this issue.1' Although some judges have recognized the
unpredictability of, and the flaws in, the public policy analysis, 145 they
have to determine what is to be done with the plaintiffs claim, and
therefore, take on the task of attempting to reach the best decision.1 4 6
A court might be influenced by the fact that the harm has already
been done and cannot be undone by the refusal of remedy.1 47 However,
base an investment decision).
144. Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG, 768 F.3d 145, 167-69, 180, 183 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied
135 S. Ct. 2836 (2015) (demonstrating that the majority and dissent differed on whether RICO
policy and the public interest was best served by allowing the in paridelicto defense); Stewart v.
Wright, 147 F. 321, 329, 340-41 (8th Cir. 1906) (demonstrating disagreement between the majority,
which decided that public policy was best served by permitting recovery by a plaintiff who
collaborated in a fraudulent gambling scheme, and the dissent, which argued that this determination
was too much a matter of an individual judge's view, and that public policy called for denial of
relief); Ground Control, LLC v. Capsco Indus., 120 So. 3d 365, 373, 376, 381-82 (Miss. 2013)
(demonstrating disagreement between the majority, which felt that allowing recovery by an
unlicensed sub-subcontractor best served the public interest by preventing the unjust enrichment of
the unlicensed subcontractor, and the dissent, which felt that refusal of recovery best served the
policy of protecting the public from unlicensed contractors); Danzig v. Danzig, 904 P.2d 312, 31416 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (demonstrating disagreement between the majority and dissent on
whether the public interest was best protected by allowing or dismissing a runner's suit to enforce a
claim for payment against the attorney who hired him).
145. Stewart, 147 F. at 341 (Sanbom, J., dissenting); Ground Control, 120 So. 3d at 376-81
(Randolph, J., dissenting).
146. Feld & Sons, Inc. v. Pechner, Dorfman, Wolfee, Rounick & Cabot, 458 A.2d 545, 551-52,
554-55 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (showing that although the court felt that a determination of relative
guilt and public policy was too dependent on the individual views of the judge and was arbitrary, its
need to resolve the case compelled it to weigh the relative guilt of the parties and to conduct the
policy analysis).
147. Carter v. Cohen, 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 303, 310-11 (Ct. App. 2010) (explaining that where the
public cannot be protected because the harm has been done, there is no serious moral turpitude, and
the defendant is at greater fault and would be unjustly enriched, the in pari delicto rule should not
be applied); Marte v. Hernandez, No. 66664-9-I 2011 WL 1833827, at *7 (Wash. Ct. App. May 16,
2011) (holding that if the harm has already been done, refusal of enforcement will not protect the
public from the harm caused by the present transaction, especially if there is no serious moral
turpitude and the defendant would be unjustly enriched).
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courts often look beyond the current dispute to consider whether
allowing or refusing relief will have an impact on discouraging these
parties and others from engaging in similar illegal transactions in the
future. The deterrent effect of the court's decision plays a significant role
in the public policy analysis,1 48 but divining the impact of the decision
on future conduct is a guess. A prediction of the deterrent effect depends
on a determination of possible incentives for entering into the
transaction, but also on whether the disposition of this case would likely
have the effect of reducing those incentives or changing behavior. 149
This could involve a complex prediction about whether the risk of nonenforcement would be enough to deter undesirable conduct, whether
prospective lawbreakers may even come to know about it, and whether
the precedential authority of the court is enough to bind future courts
dealing with similar transactions.'s The nature of the parties to
transactions of this kind may suggest an answer to the question of where
a disincentive is most-effectively aimed. The disincentive is most
effective when aimed at a potential transgressor that is most likely to
become aware of the disincentive and to take it into account in assessing
the risk of violating the law."s' Of course, because the court must
148. Juliet P. Kostritsky identifies the various factors that courts consider in evaluating relative
guilt and concludes that these factors, combined with public policy considerations, enable courts to
engage in efficient deterrence that effectively allocates the risk of non-enforcement to the party who
is most likely to respond to the deterrence. Juliet P. Kostritsky, Illegal Contracts and Efficient
Deterrence: A Study in Modern Contract Theory, 74 IOWA L. REv. 115, 126-27 (1988). For
examples of cases in which deterrence is addressed, see Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v.
Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306 (1985) (holding in a case involving insider trading, that the disincentive
is best placed on the seller of the stock because sellers are more likely to be aware of the
disincentive, and insider trading might thereby be nipped in the bud); Carter, 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d at
311 (allowing a lessee to sue the lessor for disgorgement of rent over the amount permitted by
regulation best serves the policy of the ordinance by creating a disincentive to charging excessive
rent); O'Hara v. AhIgren, 537 N.E.2d 730, 737-38 (Ill. 1989) (holding that a lawyer is already
deterred by the rules of professional responsibility from entering into a fee-splitting arrangement
with a non-lawyer, so it is best to deter the non-lawyer from this kind of transaction by refusing the
non-lawyer's claim for enforcement of the arrangement); and Geis v. Colina Del Rio LP, 362
S.W.3d 100, 110 (Tex. App. 2011) (holding that the public interest is best served by allowing the
client to sue an unlicensed architect, because this creates a disincentive to architects to provide
services without a license).
149. See Kotstritsky, supra note 148, at 145-46.
150. Id. (discussing the various alternative outcomes depending on the policy adopted).
151. John W. Wade suggests that when a court weighs disincentives, it assumes, possibly quite
fictionally, that its determination actually filters down to would-be violators and will have an impact
on their behavior. Wade, supra note 4, at 50. In her article, Illegal Contracts and Efficient
Deterrence: A Study of Modern Contract Theory, Juliet Kostrinsky offers the example of an

employer's failure to pay wages to an illegal alien. Kostritsky, supra note 148, at 150-51. Both
parties knowingly violated the law in entering into the employment contract. Id If the court bars
relief to the worker, the employer gets a windfall by avoiding payment for the work, so the
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speculate on the deterrent effect of its determination, it is hard to know
whether the court has reached the right conclusion, and often possible to
argue that the opposite conclusion would be more effective.152
E. The Equities Between the Parties: The Defendant's
Unjust Enrichment and the Plaintiffs UnfairForfeiture
Where both parties are responsible for violating the law, it is often
noted that the refusal to grant relief to the plaintiff is not for the sake of
the defendant, who merits little sympathy as a collaborator or participant
in the illegal transaction, but to protect the public interest and the
integrity of the court.1 s' Similarly, a court's decision to allow a remedy
to a guilty plaintiff is not intended as an approbation of the plaintiffs
conduct, but results from a determination that this best serves the public
interest.' 5 4 That is, the public interest is dominant and drives the
decision, even if it means that a defendant profits from the denial of the
plaintiffs claim, or a plaintiff is allowed to assert rights arising from an
illegal transaction.
Yet, this does not mean that the impact of the decision on the
parties themselves is of no account in all circumstances, and the equities
between the parties is a legitimate consideration to weigh in deciding
whether or to what extent to refuse relief to the plaintiff. This equitable
balancing between the parties will likely not overcome the court's view
of the resolution demanded by public policy."' However, the prospect
likelihood of non-enforcement gives employers an incentive to enter the illegal contract. Id. Because
the employer is likely in a stronger bargaining position and is more likely to be aware of the
disposition of such cases, a disincentive aimed at the employer is likely to be more effective. Id.
Therefore, the worker's claim should not be barred by the in pari delicto rule. In Greenwaldv. Van
Handel, the dissent questioned the deterrent effect of refusing relief under the wrongful conduct
rule, noting that the application of the rule is too unpredictable to be an effective discouragement of
unlawful conduct. 88 A.3d 467, 484-85 (Conn. 2014) (Eveleigh, J., dissenting).
152. Wade, supra note 4, at 50. In the example involving the employment contract in the
preceding note, it might just as well be argued that a disincentive aimed at the worker, who has
more to lose, would be the most effective. See supranote 151. The same is true of each of the cases
cited in that footnote-an argument could be made that placing the disincentive on the other party
could be just as effective or a more effective deterrent. Supra note 151.
153. See supra Part II.A.
154. Greenwald, 88 A.3d at 472 (stating that ex turpi causa is a universal principle, dictated by
public policy, that no one should be permitted to profit from his own wrong).
155. Honein v. Honein (In re Honein), No. NV-10-1494, 2012 WL 2428916, at *6-7 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. June 27, 2012) (indicating that although the equities between the parties favored
enforcement, the plaintiffs equal guilt precluded relief); Schneider v. Schneider, 644 A.2d 510,
515-16 (Md. 1994) (stating that although it may seem unjust to allow one malfeasor to set up his
own wrongdoing as a defense against the other, the individual equities must be subordinated to the
public interest).
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of a profoundly unfair result may have some influence in cases where
the other factors, such as equality of guilt and public interest, do not
strongly point in a direction that is opposite to that called by the equities
between the parties. 1 6

In evaluating the equities between the parties, particularly as they
apply to the question of whether the plaintiff should be denied relief,
courts may invoke the unfair forfeiture rule, which was discussed above
in relation to the remedy of restitution."s' The fact that the plaintiff, even
if in pari delicto with the defendant, would suffer an unduly harsh and
disproportionate forfeiture, resulting in an unpalatable windfall to the
defendant, may persuade a court that the equities between the parties call
for the remedy of restitution."'8
IV.

THE IMPUTATION OF AN AGENT'S ILLEGAL ACTION

TO THE PRINCIPAL
This Part explains the concept of imputation under the law of
agency and makes the point that where an agent (in most cases, a
corporate officer) engages in illegal action in the scope of his
employment, it is very difficult for the principal (the corporation) to
resist having the agent's illegal conduct imputed to it. s9 Even where the
corrupt officer has been removed from the corporate management and
the corporation seeks, for the benefit of innocent victims, to recover
losses from a party who collaborated in or enabled the officer's illegal
action, that defendant usually succeeds in raising the in pari delicto
defense against the corporation.1 60 As a result, corporations are seldom
able to recover losses from a defendant who bore some responsibility for
the officer's illegal conduct, even where that recovery would benefit
victims of the illegal action.161

156. Shimrack v. Garcia-Mendoza, 912 P.2d 822, 822-23 (Nev. 1996) (holding that where the
defendant, an attorney, was more guilty than the plaintiff, the equities favored allowing the plaintiff
to recover for work done for the defendant under an impermissible fee-sharing arrangement).
157. See supra Part IB.
158. As discussed above, restitution is based on disaffirmance of the transaction, not
enforcement, and the equities between the parties might be adequately addressed by restoring them
to the status quo ante. See supra Part II.A.

159. See infra Part IV.A-B.
160. See infra Part IV.A.
161. Daniel D. Edelman,
Against Professional Service

In Pari Delicto Continues to Curtail Financial Suits
Finns in N.Y,
CROWELL MORING (Oct. 27, 2010),

https://www.crowell.com/NewsEvents/AlertsNewsletters/all/In-Pari-Delicto-Continues-to-CurtailFinancial-Fraud-Suits-Against-Professional-Service-Firms-in-New-York.
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The Basic PrinciplesofImputation

When an agent commits a wrongful act within the scope of his
employment, that wrongful act, and any knowledge that the agent had in
committing it, is imputed to the principal.162 This is in accordance with
well-established principles of the common law of agency under which a
principal that appoints an agent to do its business must be accountable
for what the agent does on its behalf.163 Imputation is conceptually
related to the doctrine of respondeat superior, under which a principal is
liable for the torts committed by the agent in the scope of his
employment." As long as the agent is acting within the scope of his
authority, imputation occurs even if the agent acts deceptively, without
the principal's knowledge, and out of self-interest.165 This means that if
the principal sues a third party who was complicit in, or in some way
responsible for, its agent's malfeasance, that third party can raise the in
paridelicto defense against the principal by imputation, even though the
agent acted in violation of his fiduciary duty, and the principal was
unaware of the agent's illegal action.
While imputation applies generally to all agents and principals,
cases involving the assertion of the in pari delicto defense against a
principal arising from imputation of its agent's illegal actions almost
invariably concern corporations.1 6 6 An incorporated entity can act only
through its agents (its officers), and a corporation is therefore
particularly susceptible to the assertion that it is accountable for the
illegal conduct of an officer acting within the his scope of authority.
162.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY

§ 5.03

(AM. LAW INST. 2006).

163. Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG, 768 F.3d 145, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2014), cert denied 135 S. Ct.
2836 (2015) (stating that government is not a legally separate entity from the state that it represents,
so it is incorrect to characterize the government as an agent of the state, and the acts of the
government are imputed to the state, which is treated as accountable for corrupt conduct in relation
to the "Oil For Food" program); 1031 Tax Grp., LLC v. Citibank, N.A. (In re 1031 Tax Grp., LLC),
420 B.R. 178, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Kirschner v. KPMG, LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 950-51 (N.Y.
2010) ("It is a fundamental principle that has informed the law of agency for centuries ... [that] the
acts of agents . . . are presumptively imputed to their principals."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 5.03.
164. Mark J. Lowenstein, Imputation, the Adverse Interest Exception, and the Curious Case of

the Restatement (Third) of Agency, 84 U. COL. L. REv. 305, 309-11 (2013).
165. Belmont v. M.B. Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 494-95 (3d Cir. 2013) (finding that the
imputation doctrine recognizes a principal's responsibility for the acts of its agent within the scope
of authority, based not on the agent's presumed authority to do the act, but on the public policy that
a principal who has selected and delegated responsibility to the agent should be accountable).
166. Christine M. Shepard, Note, Corporate Wrongdoing and the In Pari Delicto Defense in
Auditor Malpractice Cases: A New Approach, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 275, 296-316 (2012)
(surveying the application of in pari delicto in New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Delaware
and virtually all cases arising in the corporate context).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol44/iss3/9

38

Blum: Equity's Leaded Fleet in a Contest of Scoundrels: The Assertion o

2016]

EQUITY'S LEADED FEET

8 19

Because corporate entities are typically the type of principal involved in
these cases, the rest of this discussion focuses on them.
Imputation to a corporation has its strongest justification where an
officer of the corporation, acting on behalf of the corporation, commits a
wrongful act that harms an innocent third party. For example, where the
officer makes a fraudulent misrepresentation to an innocent third party
who enters into a transaction with the corporation through the officer,
the officer's fraud is readily imputable to the corporation in a suit against
it by the victim. 167 The in pari delicto defense plays no part in this suit
where the plaintiff was uninvolved in the illegality. Similarly, if the
corporation sues the faithless officer for loss resulting from a breach of
his fiduciary duty, it would be ludicrous to allow the officer to impute
his own illegal conduct to the corporation so as to render it in pari
delicto with him."' Between these two obvious situations lie those in
which the defendant is neither the lawbreaking officer nor an innocent
victim, but participated in, abetted, or enabled the officer's illegal
action.16 9 While the in pari delicto defense is potentially available to
such a defendant by imputation of the officer's illegal conduct to the
corporation, the appropriateness of allowing the defense is questionable
because the fundamental purpose of imputation-the protection of an
innocent third party-is not served.1 70
Even more troublesome are cases where the party who colluded
with or enabled the officer's wrongdoing is itself an agent of the
corporation, such as the corporation's accountant or lawyer who
colluded in or failed to prevent the illegal action of the officer. For
example, imagine that an officer of a corporation fraudulently promotes
an investment fund that is in fact a Ponzi scheme. 171 The corporation's
auditor colludes in the deception or fails to exercise the proper degree of
professional diligence to detect it. 172 Clearly, the innocent investors
have, and should have, a cause of action against the corporation for
167. See, e.g., Belmont, 798 F.2d at 477 (describing a corporate officer perpetrating a Ponzi
scheme on innocent third parties and remanding for trial).
168. A wrongdoing insider cannot rely on the imputation of his own conduct to the corporation
for the purpose of raising the in pari delicto defense if sued by the corporation for loss arising from
that conduct. Grayson Consulting, Inc. v. Wachovia Sec., LLP (In re Derivium Capital LLC), 716
F.3d 355, 368 (4th Cir. 2013); Zazzali v. Hirschler, Fleischer, P.C., 482 B.R. 495, 513-14 (D. Del.
2012); Pitt Penn Holding Co. v. Mazzuto (In re Pitt Penn Holding Co.), 484 B.R. 25, 38-39, 41 (D.
Del. 2012); Jurista v. Amerinox Processing, Inc., 492 B.R. 707, 739 (D.N.J. 2013); O'Connell v.
Pers. Fin. Servs., Inc. (In re Arbco Capital Mgmt., LLP), 498 B.R. 32,45 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
169. Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449,451 (7th Cir. 1982).
170. Scholes v. Lehman, 56 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1995).
171. Id
172. Id
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losses resulting from the fraud of its officer. 173 If the corporation sues its
auditor, either for deliberate collusion or malpractice, the defendant will
seek to impute the officer's wrong to the corporation and to raise the in
pari delicto defense to that suit. There would be greater justification to
allow that defense if the wrongdoing officer was still in control of the
corporation or would otherwise benefit from the suit. Where the
wrongdoing officer has been ousted and the corporation's recovery
would not benefit the officerl 7 4 but would benefit only innocent
shareholders, investors, or creditors, allowing the in pari delicto defense
perverts the goals of both imputation and the in pari delicto rule.1 75 yet,
courts readily allow imputation and the in pari delicto defense under
these circumstances.17 The rationale for doing so is that imputation
creates an incentive for the corporation to ensure that it appoints
trustworthy agents, and that it monitors and controls them effectively. 77
173. That is, the investors are not investing in the corporation itself, so as to become
stockholders, but are placing funds with the corporation for investment on their behalf by the
corporation. When the officers do not make the investments as represented, but instead operate a
Ponzi scheme, the investors become tort creditors. Id. at 755.
174. The question of whether a wrongdoing officer would be benefitted by the corporation's
recovery is factual and requires an evaluation of the circumstances of each case. A benefit could be
direct (for example, if the officer holds shares in the corporation) or indirect (for example, if
recovery by the corporation would reduce any personal liability of the officer). Cenco, Inc., 686
F.2d at 455-57.
175. Kevin H. Michels points out that vicarious liability and imputation assume that the agent
has committed a wrong against a third party, but a principal's suit against its lawyer for breach of
the lawyer's duty to the principal does not involve an innocent third party, but rather another agent
with her own duties to the principal. Kevin H. Michels, The CorporateAttorney as "Internal"
Gatekeeper and the In Pari Delicto Defense: A Proposed New Standard, 4 ST. MARY'S J. LEGAL

MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 318, 353-56 (2014). He observes that imputation is even less defensible
where the lawyer was specifically engaged to monitor or uncover officer malfeasance and failed to
discharge that duty properly. Id. Section 5.04 of the Restatement (Third) of Agency confines
imputation to situations in which it is "necessary to protect the rights of a third party who dealt with
the principal in good faith," which excludes a third party who dealt with the agent "knowing or
having reason to know that the agent acts adversely to the principal." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 5.04 (AM. LAW INST. 2005). While the section speaks of good faith, its reference to a
"reason to know" standard suggests that imputation should not be applied if the third party is a
professional who negligently failed in his duty to the principal to detect the agent's illegal actions.
Id. The dissent in Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG, argues that the rationale supporting imputation
breaks down where there has been collusive conduct between the agent and the defendant because
the purpose of the rule is to protect innocent third parties, not those who conspired with the agent.
768 F.3d 145, 179-82 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 2836 (2015) (Droney, J., dissenting).
176. Stewart v. Wilmington Tr. SP Serv., Inc., 112 A.3d 271, 307-08 (Del. Ch. 2015)
(observing that to refuse imputation where the corporation sues for the benefit of stockholders in a
derivative suit would eviscerate the inpari delicto rule).
177. Belmont v. M.B. Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 495 (3d Cir. 2013) (finding that the
doctrine of imputation creates an incentive for the principal to choose the agent carefully and to take
care in delegating to him); Cenco, Inc., 686 F.2d at 455-56; MCA Fin. Corp. v. Grant Thornton,
LLP, 687 N.W.2d 850, 855 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004); Glenbrook Capital Ltd. P'ship v. Dodds (In re
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However, the irony of this argument, when used to justify imputation to
allow the in pari delicto rule to be raised by a corporation's auditor or
lawyer, is that one of the important means of control open to a board of
directors is the employment of independent and competent professionals.
Where these professionals fail to perform properly, it would seem that
there is an equally strong public interest in holding them accountable
and giving them a disincentive to neglect their duties.I"
It must be stressed that imputation of the officer's wrongdoing
does not, in itself, ensure that the defendant will escape accountability
for a role in the illegal action. First, the imputation of the officer's
wrongdoing is to the corporation, and not to stakeholders in the
corporation, so allowing the in pari delicto defense against the
corporation does not affect any direct cause of action that innocent
stakeholders might have against the collaborator or enabler. 7 9 However,
the existence of a stakeholder's independent cause of action against the
collaborator or enabler is dependent on the nature of the claim and the
relationship between the stakeholder and the collaborator or enabler. In
some cases, there may not be any independent cause of action,' 80

Amerco Derivative Litig.), 252 P.3d 681, 694-96 (Nev. 2011); NCP Litig. Tr. v. KPMG, LLP, 901
A.2d 871, 879-80 (N.J. 2006) (holding that the rationale for imputation is to give the principal an
incentive to choose the agent carefully and to establish effective monitoring procedures); Kirschner
v. KPMG, LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 951-52 (N.Y. 2010) (holding that in a choice between the innocent
stakeholders in the corporation, and the innocent stakeholders in the accounting firm sued for
malpractice by the corporation, the corporate stakeholders, whose agent committed the fraud, should
bear the loss); Lowenstein, supra note 164, at 316-17.
178. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny Health Educ. & Res. Found. v.
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 607 F.3d 346, 354-55 (3d Cir. 2010); Michels, supra note 175, at
356-58, argues that while imputation may give the corporation the incentive to monitor its agents,
the employment of professionals is an important means of monitoring, so it seems ironic that the
monitor can evade responsibility for its failure to do its job by imputing the officer's wrongdoing to
the corporation and raising the in pari delicto defense.
179. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of PSA, Inc. v. Edwards, 437 F.3d 1145, 1151
(11th Cir. 2006) (holding that the individual creditors of the principal could pursue claims against
the abettor of the agent's fraud without being subject to the inpari delicto defense).
180. Kohut v. Metzler Loricchio Seera & Co., P.C. (In re Munivest Servs., LLC), 500 B.R.
487, 501-04 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (holding that investors in a corporation who were victims of a Ponzi
scheme had no independent malpractice cause of action against the corporation's accountant
because they were neither clients of the accountant nor third party beneficiaries of the accountant's
contract with the corporation); MCA Fin. Corp. v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 687 N.W.2d at 855-56
(Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (declining to decide if innocent investors had their own cause of action
against the corporation's accountant but noting that if they did, the wrongful act of the corporate
officer would not be imputed to them, even though it is imputed to the corporation); Kirschner v.
K&L Gates, LLP, 46 A.3d 737, 761 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (noting that a person, other than the
principal, injured by the agent's illegal action may or may not have a direct cause of action against
the person who abetted or overlooked the illegal conduct).
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and the only recourse that the stakeholder may have would be through
the corporation.
Second, imputation to the corporation does not assure that the
defendant will ultimately succeed in the in pari delicto defense. The
determination that the in pari delicto defense can be raised against the
corporation is just the first step in the process of deciding if the in pari
delicto defense is viable.'"' The next step is to conduct the balancing test
set out in Part III to determine if the defense should prevail.' 82
In short, while imputation does not mean that the defendant will
prevail in the end, it is the first step towards an unprincipled application
of the in pari delicto rule if it is too-readily allowed at the instance of a
defendant who colluded in or enabled the officer's illegal action. Courts
should not apply principles of imputation mechanically, but should focus
on the duty owed by the defendant to the corporation, the ultimate
beneficiaries of the suit, and the existence of any independent cause of
action against the defendant by those beneficiaries.
B.

The Difficulty ofAvoiding Imputation Under the Adverse Interest
Exception and the Sole Actor Rule

1. The Restricted Availability of the Adverse Interest Exception
to Imputation
The adverse interest exception is a well-recognized exception to
imputation: the officer's illegal act will not be imputed to the
corporation if the officer engaged in the illegal act solely for his own
personal benefit and no benefit or advantage accrued to the
corporation. 8 Because adverse interest is an exception to imputation,
the question of whether it applies does not arise unless the court first
finds that the officer's action is imputable to the corporation. 8 4 The

181. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
182. See supra Part Ill. Courts sometimes express relative guilt as a basis for imputation or as a
reason for not applying the adverse interest exception, which tends to confuse matters. See NCP
Litig. Tr., 901 A.2d at 881 (explaining that the adverse interest exception should apply whether the
defendant was merely negligent or an active participant); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of
Allegheny Health Educ. and Res. Found. v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 989 A.2d 313, 335-36
(Pa. 2010) (finding imputation should be allowed where auditors were merely negligent in not
detecting fraud, but it should not apply where they actively colluded in it). Relative guilt is not
relevant to imputation or to the availability of the adverse interest exception, but to the question of
whether the in pari delicto defense should prevail.
183. Williamson v. Stallone, 905 N.Y.S.2d 740, 752 (Sup. Ct. 2010).
184. Id. at 752-53 (finding imputation was not appropriate, so the court did not have to reach
the question of adverse interest).
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exception is, in essence, an application of the general rule that the
conduct of an agent is imputed to the principal only where the agent's
act is within the scope of his employment. Where the act is so far
removed from the interests of the corporation, it may be deemed to be
outside the officer's scope of employment.' However, this rationale
must be approached with caution because many courts apply the adverse
interest exception with excruciating narrowness.
It is common for courts to confine the exception to situations in
which the action benefitted only the officer and provided no conceivable
benefit to the corporation. The test used by these courts to decide if the
corporation received a benefit is very broad and inclusive: the
corporation benefits from the action if it in any way advanced the
corporation's interests, even if that benefit was fleeting and short-term
and was ultimately lost when the final impact of the malfeasance
struck.'1 6 So, for example, an officer's fraud or deception that allows the
corporation to survive a bit longer, or to gain a brief economic advantage
that was ultimately lost, is enough to constitute a benefit."' This means
that to establish the exception, the corporation must demonstrate that the

185. Anderson v. Cordell (In re Infinity Bus. Grp., Inc.), 497 B.R. 794, 805-07 (D.S.C. 2013);
1031 Tax Grp., LLC v. Citibank, N.A. (In re 1031 Tax Grp., LLC), 420 B.R. 178, 200 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (explaining that the manager must have abdicated completely from the interests of the
corporation so that he is acting outside of the scope of his authority); Symbol Tech., Inc. v. Deloitte
& Touche, LLP, 888 N.Y.S.2d 538, 542-43 (App. Div. 2009) (explaining that the adverse interest
exception is narrowly defined, so that the officer must have been acting entirely in his own interest
and outside the scope of his authority).
186. Nisselson v. Lernout, 469 F.3d 143, 156-57 (1st Cir. 2006); Zazzali v. Eide Bailly, LLP.,
No. 1:12-CV-349-S, 2013 WL 6045978, at *20 (D. Idaho Nov. 14, 2013); Pitt Penn Holding Co. v.
Mazzuto (In re Pitt Penn Holding Co.), 484 B.R. 25, 39-40 (D. Del. 2012); In re 1031 Tax Grp.,
LLC, 420 B.R. at 200; MCA Fin. Corp. v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 687 N.W.2d 850, 857 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2004); Bondi v. Citigroup, Inc., 32 A.3d 1158, 1174-75 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011);
Symbol Techs., 888 N.Y.S.2d at 542-43.
187. Nisselson, 469 F.3d at 156-57 (finding that fleeting value was enough to preclude
application of the exception where officers of the corporation misstated its revenue to the target of a
merger so that the merged entity collapsed shortly after the merger); O'Connell v. Pers. Fin. Servs.,
Inc. (In re Arbco Capital Mgmt., LLP), 498 B.R. 32, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding that the exception
is narrow, and even a short-term benefit, such as the longer survival of the corporation, is enough,
even if the actions harmed the corporation in the long-term); Zazzali, 2013 WL 6045978, at *20
(finding that the adverse interest exception is narrow and does not apply if the corporation received
any benefit from the officer's illegal action, even if the action eventually led to the collapse of the
corporation); Bondi, 32 A.3d at 1174-75 (finding management's fraudulent efforts to keep the
corporation afloat benefitted the corporation, even if only transitorily, so that the adverse interest
exception did not apply-but sometimes the transitory benefit could be so minimal that the
exception might apply); MCA Finan. Corp., 687 N.W.2d at 857 (finding that the exception applies
only where a corporate officer acts solely for his own benefit and against the interests of the
corporation, and it does not matter that the actions resulted in deepening the insolvency of the
corporation and led to its ultimate collapse).
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officer so completely abandoned the corporation's interests that no
benefit whatsoever was derived from the conduct. On this narrow test,
sometimes referred to as the "total abandonment" rule,' 88 the exception
does not apply much beyond situations in which the illegal action is
aimed directly against the corporation, such as an officer's
embezzlement of corporate funds or looting of corporate assets. 89
Although the determinative question is whether there is some
discernable benefit to the corporation, the relevance of the officer's state
of mind is unclear. 90 While some courts stress that it is the effect of
benefit that is crucial, rather than the intention of the officer,'91 others
treat the officer's motivation as highly relevant.1 92
Courts that construe the exception narrowly hold that broad
availability of the in pari delicto defense is needed to avoid shifting the

188. In re Infinity Bus. Grp., Inc., 497 B.R. at 809 (asserting the total abandonment standard is
the majority rule); In re 1031 Tax Grp., LLC, 420 B.R. at 200; Stewart v. Wilmington Tr. SP Serv.,
Inc., 112 A.3d 271, 303, 309 (Del. Ch. 2015) (holding that the adverse interest exception covers
only total abandonment, such as outright stealing from the corporation, and does not apply if the
corporation received any benefit, even if outweighed by long-term damage); Symbol Techs., 888
N.Y.S.2d. at 543.
189. Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG, 768 F.3d 145, 166-67 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied 135 S. Ct.
2836 (2015) (finding the adverse interest exception inapplicable because the Hussein regime did not
totally abandon Iraq's interests); Peterson v. McGladrey & Pullen, LLP, 676 F.3d 594, 599 (7th Cir.
2012) (finding that fraud is imputed where officers are not stealing from the corporation, but are
using it as an engine of theft from outsiders); Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449,
454-55 (7th Cir. 1982); Glenbrook Capital Ltd. P'ship v. Dodds (In re Amerco Derivative Litig.),
252 P.3d 681, 694-96 (Nev. 2011) (finding corporate officers must have acted completely adverse to
the corporation, so that there has been outright theft or embezzlement that does not benefit the
principal in any way); Kirschner v. K&L Gates, LLP, 46 A.3d 737, 763-65 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012)
(applying the adverse interest exception and not imputing the officer's action to the corporation
where the corporate officer looted the corporation).
190. See Bondi, 32 A.3d at 1174.
191. In re Arbco Capital Mgmt., LLP, 498 B.R at 46 (noting that it is not enough to show
that the agent acted to benefit himself, not the principal); In re Amerco Derivative Litig., 252 P.3d
at 694-96 (noting that a mere conflict of interest or the agent's intent to benefit his own interests
is not enough).
192. Section 5.04 of the Restatement (Third) ofAgency recognizes agent intent as relevant, and
provides that imputation should not occur if the agent acts adversely to the principal, "intending to
act solely for the agent's own purposes or those of another person." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 5.04 (AM. LAW INST. 2006); see Bankr. Servs., Inc. v. Ernst & Young LLP (In re CBI
Holding Co.), 529 F.3d 432, 451-52 (2d Cir. 2008) (explaining that the total abandonment standard
looks principally to the intent of the manager, and that intent to benefit, as opposed to actual benefit,
is key); Rogers v. McDorman, 521 F.3d 381, 394-95 (5th Cir. 2008) (stating the exception did not
apply where the corporate officer engaged in a check kiting scheme for the purpose of benefitting
the corporation, and not for personal gain); In re 1031 Tax Grp., LLC, 420 B.R. at 200 (the officer's
intent is an important factor and may override some incidental benefit to the corporation); MCA Fin.
Corp., 687 N.W.2d at 857-58 (finding that if a corporate officer acted in the misguided belief that
his actions might help the corporation, the adverse interest exception does not apply).
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risk of officer malfeasance to the persons who dealt with the officer.1 93
This rationale makes sense with regard to a claim by an innocent party
who played no role in the wrongdoing. However, where the person
dealing with the officer enabled or colluded in the misconduct, a lessrestrictive exception is more appropriate.194 Some courts recognize this
and are willing to disregard a transitory, incidental, or meaningless
benefit to the corporation where the defendant collaborated in or enabled
the wrongdoing."' This more realistic test of benefit allows for the use
of the adverse interest exception to avoid imputation where
considerations of policy and fairness and the goals of the in pari delicto
rule point to the refusal of the defense.
2. The Sole Actor Doctrine as a Further Limit on the Availability
of the Adverse Interest Exception
The adverse interest exception is further weakened by another
limitation, known as the "sole actor" doctrine, which is sometimes
described as an exception to the adverse interest exception; even if the
test for the adverse interest exception is satisfied, the exception cannot
be used if the officer who engaged in the illegal action has such
complete control over the corporation that the officer and the corporation
can be viewed as the same entity.196 This limitation has some affinity to

193. Belmont v. M.B. Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470,495-96 (3d Cir. 2013).
194. Id (observing that courts that require only a small benefit to the corporation favor a
readily available in paridelicto defense so as not to allocate the risk of officer wrongdoing to those
who transact with the corporation, but courts that require a more material benefit are concerned
about collusion between the officer and the defendant).
195. In re CBI Holding Co., 529 F.3d at 453 (explaining that the illusory benefit of prolonging
the corporation's existence should not be treated as a benefit); In re Arbco CapitalMgmt., LLP, 498
B.R at 46-47; Anderson v. Cordell (In re Infinity Bus. Grp., Inc.), 497 B.R. 794, 809-10
(D.S.C. 2013); NCP Litig. Tr. v. KPMG, LLP, 901 A.2d 871, 885-86 (N.J. 2006) (softening of the
imputation rule allows just recovery); Bondi, 32 A.3d at 1175 (explaining that sometimes the
transitory benefit could be so minimal and illusory that the exception might apply); Kirschner v.
KPMG, LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 962 (N.Y. 2010) (Ciparick, J. dissenting) (noting that an illusory
short term benefit should not be enough to preclude the exception); Official Comm. of Unsecured
Creditors of Allegheny Health Educ. and Res. Found. v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 989 A.2d
313, 335-36 (Pa. 2010) (rejecting a "peppercorn" test of benefit).
196. Grayson Consulting, Inc. v. Wachovia Sec., LLP (In re Derivium Capital LLC), 716 F.3d
355, 368 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting that the sole actor rule defeats the adverse interest exception);
Janvey v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 712 F.3d 185, 191 (5th Cir. 2013); O'Connell
v. Pers. Fin. Servs., Inc. (In re Arbco Capital Mgmt., LLP), 498 B.R. 32, 47-48 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(explaining that the sole actor rule is an exception to the adverse interest exception); In re 1031 Tax
Grp., LLC, 420 B.R. at 202 (finding that there is no reason for the adverse interest exception when
principal and agent are essentially the same); Bash v. Textrol Fin. Corp., 483 B.R. 630, 650-51
(N.D. Ohio 2012) (explaining that the sole actor rule limits the adverse interest exception); Stewart
v. Wilmington Tr. SP Serv., Inc., 112 A.3d 271, 310-11 (Del. Ch. 2015).
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the concept of piercing the corporate veil where a corporation is the
mere alter ego of its owner.1 17 It is also a well-established principle of
agency law. 198 The effect of this doctrine is that even if the officer acted
in a way that is completely adverse to the corporation (under the narrow
application of the adverse interest exception described above), the
corporation cannot avoid imputation if the officer's control and
dominance of the corporation qualifies him as a sole actor.1 99
The sole actor rule is not limited to situations in which the
wrongdoing officer is the sole officer and shareholder in the corporation.
It could also apply where there are other officers or shareholders, but the
wrongdoing officer completely dominates and controls the corporation
so that there is no constituency in the corporation that can exercise
restraint on his conduct. 20 0 Therefore, the key to deciding if the sole
actor rule should apply is whether there are any innocent decisionmakers (that is, persons not implicated in the illegal conduct) in the
corporation with the power to stop the officer's wrongdoing. 201 While
the existence of an innocent decision-maker may be relatively easy to
establish, it is much more difficult and speculative to decide if the
innocent party was in fact able to prevent the illegal act. If no such
innocent decision-makers exist, the illegal conduct is imputed to the
corporation, even where the officer acted solely for his own benefit in
197. While the sole actor doctrine is commonly characterized as an exception to the adverse
interest exception, it can be seen simply as a conclusion that imputation is not needed because the
corporation, as the alter ego of the officer, was itself directly involved in the illegal action. Teneyck,
Inc., v. Rosenberg, 957 N.Y.S.2d 845, 848-49 (App. Div. 2011) (explaining that the corporation,
acting through its sole owner, must be viewed as a participant in the owner's illegal action).
198. In re Derivium CapitalLLC, 716 F.3d at 368.
199. Hagan v. Baird (In re B&P Baird Holdings, Inc.), 591 F. App'x 434, 441 (6th Cir. 2015);
USACM Liquidating Tr. v. Deloitte & Touche, 523 F. App'x 488, 489 (9th Cir. 2013); In re
Derivium Capital LLC, 716 F.3d at 368; Uecker v. Wells Fargo Capital Fin., LLC (In re Mortg.
Fund '08 LLC), 527 B.R. 351, 369 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Bash, 483 B.R. at 651. Although the rule is
referred to as the "sole actor" doctrine, it could also apply where there is more than one actor
involved in the illegal conduct (say, all of the corporation's management), but those actors, in
combination, exercised complete control over the corporation. USACM Liquidating Tr., 523 F.
App'x at 489-90 (noting that the sole actor rule applied where the majority shareholders of the
corporation held all the top management positions, and completely controlled the corporation).
200. USA CMLiquidatingTr., 523 F. App'x at 490.
201. In re B&P BairdHoldings, Inc., 591 F. App'x at 441-42; USA CMLiquidatingTr., 523 F.
App'x 488; In re Arbco CapitalMgmt., LLP, 498 B.R at 47-48; Anderson v. Cordell (In re Infinity
Bus. Grp., Inc.), 497 B.R. 794, 814 (D.S.C. 2013); In re 1031 Tax Grp., LLC, 420 B.R. at 202-03
(finding that if there is an innocent insider who had the power to stop the fraud, the offending
officer is not a sole actor and the corporation is not his alter ego); Glenbrook Capital Ltd. P'ship v.
Dodds (In re Amerco Derivative Litig.), 252 P.3d 681, 696 (Nev. 2011). Not all courts recognize
that the presence of innocent decision-makers will prevent the application of the sole actor rule. In
Bash, the court, while noting that the plaintiff had not shown the existence of innocent decisionmakers, questioned whether this fact was even relevant. 483 B.R. at 652.
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looting or stealing from the corporation, with no benefit to the
corporation itself.202 As a general matter, this makes sense because the

corporation is the alter ego of the officer. However, where there are in
fact innocent officers or shareholders, or where recovery would benefit
creditors,20 3 the sole actor rule makes it difficult, if not impossible, for
the corporation to resist imputation. This means that the in pari delicto
defense can be raised by a defendant who enabled or colluded in the
officer's wrongdoing. It is hard to reconcile this result with the
underlying goals of the in pari delicto rule.20
V.

IMPUTATION OF ILLEGAL CONDUCT TO RECEIVERS AND
BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEES

This Part deals with the situation in which a corporation has been
placed into receivership or bankruptcy following (and usually as a result
of) extensive illegal conduct by its officer. One of the primary functions
of a receiver or trustee is to pursue claims for the benefit of victims of
the illegal conduct.2 05 Where such a claim is a suit against a defendant
who collaborated in or enabled the officer's illegal action, that defendant
is likely to raise the in pari delicto defense on the theory that the illegal
action should be imputed to the receiver or trustee.2 0 6 The question of
whether imputation is appropriate in this situation depends on two
factors: first, whether or not the claim derives from the corporation. If it
does not, no imputation occurs. If it does, the second factor becomes
relevant: whether the corporation is in receivership or bankruptcy.
Courts generally do not impute the illegal conduct to a receiver, but do
impute it to a trustee.207 While the different treatment of receivers and

202. In re Derivium CapitalLLC, 716 F.3d at 36-69.
203. As noted earlier, innocent investors may not be stockholders in the corporation, but
may be persons who gave funds to the corporation to invest on their behalf, so that
upon misappropriation and loss of the funds, they become tort creditors of the corporation. See
supra note 180.
204. Scholes v. Lehman, 56 F.3d 750, 754-55 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that where the sole
shareholder, who used "zombie" corporations as his "robotic tools," has been ousted, recovery by
the corporation is for the benefit of creditors, including defrauded investors, and should be allowed).
205. Janvey v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 712 F.3d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 2013)
(allowing the receiver to sue for and recover fraudulent transfers made by the former corporate
officer who had operated a Ponzi scheme); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Edwards,
437 F.3d 1145, 1149-50 (11th Cir. 2006); Williamson v. Stallone, 905 N.Y.S.2d 740, 752-53 (Sup.
Ct. 2010).
206. Official Comm. of UnsecuredCreditors, 437 F.3d at 1152; John T. Gregg, The Doctrine of
In Pari Delicto: Recent Developments, 5 ANN. SURV. OF BANK. L. 1, 1-3 (2006).
207. Gregg, supranote 206, at 3-5.
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trustees can be explained on purely doctrinal grounds,208 imputation to a
trustee cannot be reconciled with the underlying purpose and policy of
the in paridelicto rule.209
A.

The Context in Which the In Pari Delicto Defense is Asserted
Against a Receiver or Trustee

The receiver or trustee may have a cause of action against a
wrongdoing defendant, independent from any claim that the corporation
itself may have had. For example, if the defendant received an improper
payment or transfer of property from the corrupt officer, the receiver or
trustee's suit to recover that fraudulent transfer of corporate assets
is not based on a right of the corporation, but derives from succession to
a right of creditors or from a statutory grant of the right.210 In this
situation, the in paridelicto defense cannot be asserted by the defendant
because the trustee or receiver does not step into the shoes of the
corporation and is not subject to any defense that could have been raised
against the corporation by imputation. However, other causes of action
against a party that participated in, aided, or wrongfully overlooked the
officer's wrongdoing, such as a claim for professional malpractice
against the corporation's lawyers or accountants, breach of fiduciary
duty, or breach of contract, derive from the corporation. Where the
receiver or trustee asserts such a claim, he is in the position of a
successor to the corporation.21
208. Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors, 437 F.3d at 1151-52 (noting that a receiver is
distinguishable from a bankruptcy trustee because the trustee's rights are governed by the
Bankruptcy Code); Uecker v. Wells Fargo Capital Fin., LLC (In re Mortg. Fund '08 LLC), 527 B.R.
351, 368 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (explaining that a receiver is distinguished from a bankruptcy trustee in
that the receiver is not subject to the strictures of § 541 of the Bankruptcy Code); Gregg, supra note
206, at 2-5.
209. See Lowenstein, supra note 164, at 317-18, 322-23; supra notes 34-35 and accompanying
text.
210. A bankruptcy trustee has a statutory right to recover fraudulent transfers. Infra Part V.B.
A receiver or similar official appointed under state law is treated as a successor of innocent
investors. See, e.g., Williamson v. Stallone, 905 N.Y.S.2d 740, 751 (Sup. Ct. 2010). The general
partner of a limited partnership deliberately and significantly overstated the value of a hedge find
operated by the partnership, as a result of which some investors were paid out much more than they
were entitled to receive. Id. at 749-50. After the collapse of the fund, the liquidating trustee
appointed by the court sought to recover the overpayments to the investors as fraudulent transfers.
Id. at 750. As discussed below, the trustee was held not to be subject to the in pari delicto defense.
Id. at 752-53; infra Part V.B. In Janvey, the receiver sued for and was able to recover fraudulent
transfers-campaign contributions-made by the former corporate officer who had operated a Ponzi
scheme. Janvey, 712 F.3d at 189.
211. Williamson, 90 N.Y.S.2d at 751 (explaining that an "innocent successor [trustee]" is one
who is appointed by the court to recover funds from wrongdoers for the benefit of the limited

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol44/iss3/9

48

Blum: Equity's Leaded Fleet in a Contest of Scoundrels: The Assertion o

2016]

EQUITY'S LEADED FEET

829

The in pari delicto rule arises in this context where the defendant
argues that the corporation itself is subject to the defense through the
imputation of its officer's illegal action, and that this imputation extends
to the receiver or trustee who, as successor to the corporation's claim, is
subject to any defenses to the claim that could have been asserted against
the corporation.2 12 To decide if imputation extends to the receiver or
trustee, courts apply agency law to determine if there should be
imputation to the corporation, and then apply the law governing
receiverships or bankruptcy to decide the question of further
imputation.2 13 Most courts do not impute the officer's illegal conduct to
the receiver. 214 However, courts reach the opposite conclusion with
regard to bankruptcy trustees and hold that imputation does bar claims
by a trustee where the trustee claims as successor to the debtor.2 15 While
imputation can be supported on doctrinal grounds, it is hard to justify in
light of the underlying purpose and equitable character of the in pari
delicto rule. Imputation to an official who represents the interests of
victims who were not implicated in the wrongdoing is inconsistent with
the stated goal of the rule-the refusal to aid a wrongdoing plaintiff who
is equally or more guilty than the defendant. It thereby deprives victims
of the wrongdoing of recovery and allows the defendant to escape
accountability for its role in the illegal transaction. 2 16 In addition, it is
most unlikely that the policy goal of deterrence could be achieved by
refusing relief to the victims.

2 17

B.

Receivers

Receivership is an equitable remedy under state law or may be
provided by a statute regulating a particular industry. 218 A receiver is a
court-appointed official whose task is to take control of a failed
partners who lost money).
212. Id. at 752.
213. Id. at 750-51.
214. Id. at 751.
215. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 354-58 (3d
Cir. 2001); Steven Rhodes & Kathy Bazoian Phelps, Equity Receivers and the In Pari Delicto
Defense, 69 Bus. LAW. 699, 702-03 (2014).
216. Rhodes & Phelps, supra note 215, at 709-11 (finding that where a receiver represents
innocent victims, the court is not mediating a dispute between wrongdoers, and the grant of relief
would not benefit the wrongdoer, so refusing relief merely harms those who had no role in or
control over the wrongdoing officer).
217. Id. at 703, 709-10 (refusing relief to victims, who had no control over the actions of the
wrongdoing officer, does not deter illegality by an officer, but instead encourages the defendant's
participation in it and perpetuates the victimization of the victims).
218. Id. at 702, 708-09; 65 AM. JUR. 2d Receivers § 15 (2015).
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corporation and, amongst other things, recover claims for the benefit of
innocent stakeholders in the corporation.219 The equitable nature of a
receivership requires a court to take particular care to ensure that a
defendant who colluded with or failed in its duty to avert illegal action
by a corporate officer should not be able to achieve the inequitable result
of barring the receiver's recovery by asserting the in pari delicto
defense.2 20 While some courts disregard this principle and treat a
receiver as a mere successor to the corporation, subject to any in pari
delicto defense that could be raised by imputation against the
corporation,2 21 this is not a common approach. The better and more
prevalent view is that a receiver appointed in equity to deal with the
affairs of the corporation in receivership is not a representative of the
corporation, but instead is a representative of its innocent investors and
creditors.2 22 Therefore, even if the acts of the corporate officer are
imputed to the corporation under the law of agency, the imputation does
not extend to the receiver, and the receiver's claim is not subject to the
in pari delicto defense. 223 This principle has also been applied to other
officials appointed by a court to manage the affairs of a failed entity.224

219. Rhodes & Phelps, supra note 215, at 708-09.
220. Id at 702, 709, 711.
221. Wuliger v. Mfrs. Life Ins. Co., 567 F.3d 787, 798-99 (6th Cir. 2009); Stewart v.
Wilmington Tr. SP Serv., Inc., 112 A.3d 271, 313-14 (Del. Ch. 2015) (noting that because a
corporation itself, even in a derivative suit, is not treated as an innocent party, it would be
inconsistent to treat a receiver as such); MCA Fin. Corp. v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 687 N.W.2d 850,
858-59, 861 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004). In Cobalt Multifamily Investors, LLC v. Arden, the court held
that the receiver for a corporation lacked standing to sue one who collaborated in the illegal actions
of a corporate officer. However, it seems that the court reached this conclusion by misapplying
precedent relating to a bankruptcy trustee under the so-called Wagoner Rule discussed in note 243.
46 F. Supp. 3d 357, 361-62, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
222. Wooley v. Lucksinger, 61 So. 3d 507, 606 (La. 2011).
223. Janvey v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 712 F.3d 185, 190 (5th Cir. 2013)
(explaining that once a receiver is appointed, the fraudulent conveyance of funds by a corporate
officer is not imputed to the receiver); Jones v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 666 F.3d 955, 966 (5th Cir.
2012) (applying the in pari delicto rule to a receiver would undermine the purpose of the
receivership-to benefit the victims of fraud); Scholes v. Lehman, 56 F.3d 750, 754-55 (7th Cir.
1995) (noting that once the wrongdoer has been removed, and the corporation is in the hands of a
receiver, the wrongful acts of the former officer are not imputed to the receiver); Reneker v. Offill,
No. 3.08-CV1394-D, 2012 WL 2158733, at *26 (N.D. Tex. June 14, 2012) (applying the in pari
delicto rule would undermine the receivership's goal of recovering funds for the benefit of innocent
parties); Wooley, 61 So. 3d at 507 (explaining that the receiver of an insolvent corporation acts as
the representative of innocent shareholders and can maintain an action against a wrongdoer even if
the corporation itself could not).
224. Williamson v. Stallone, 905 N.Y.S.2d 740, 752-53 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (finding that a
liquidating trustee, appointed by the court under state law to liquidate the assets of a general
partnership, is an impartial party who must be given the status of an innocent successor, precluding
imputation and the assertion of the inparidelictodefense).
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Trustees in Bankruptcy

In the bankruptcy context, the corporation may be in liquidation
under either Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code,225 or may
be seeking to rehabilitate its business through bankruptcy reorganization
under Chapter 11.226 In a Chapter 11 case, the debtor-corporation itself
usually assumes the role of trustee as a debtor in possession, 2 2 7 but even
if there is no independent trustee, the management of the debtor in
possession will not likely include any former officer whose illegal
conduct brought it to ruin.228 If the guilty officer tries to hold onto
control of the bankrupt corporation as it seeks to reorganize under
Chapter 11, creditors can apply to remove and replace him by a
trustee.229 In the remainder of this discussion, "trustee" must be
understood to mean either an independent trustee or a debtor in
possession in the role of a trustee. One of the trustee's principal tasks is
to collect property or money due to the corporation, which will
ultimately enhance recovery by its creditors (including those who gave
money to the corporation for investment).230
The crucial distinction between equitable receiverships and
bankruptcy is that the rights of the trustee are governed by the
Bankruptcy Code.231 As noted earlier, the determination of whether the
trustee is subject to the in pari delicto defense depends on whether the
trustee's right of action derives from the rights of the debtor or is a
statutory right conferred on the trustee by the Bankruptcy Code.232
Where the claim asserted by the trustee on behalf of the bankruptcy
estate is a claim that the debtor held at the date of the bankruptcy
petition, the trustee steps into the debtor's shoes, so that she acquires no
greater rights than the debtor had and is subject to any defense that could
have been raised against the debtor. 233 By contrast, where the trustee's
225.
226.
227.
228.

See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2012).
11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (2012).
11 U.S.C. § 1107 (2012).
Lawrence V. Gelber & Aaron Wernick, Ousting the Debtor in Possession: The Good, the

Bad and the Ugly ofReplacing a Debtor's Management with a Chapter II Trustee, COM. BANKR.

LITIG. (Oct. 3, 2013), https://www.dailydac.com/commercialbankruptcy/litigation/articles/oustingthe-debtor-in-possession-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-of-replacing-a-debtors-management-witha-chapter-1 1-trustee.
229. 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (2012).
230. 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1) (2012).
231. Id; 65 AM. JUR. 2d Receivers § 15 (2015).
232. 11 U.S.C. § 704; 65 AM. JUR. 2d Receivers § 15.
233. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Edwards, 437 F.3d 1145, 1149-52 (11th
Cir. 2006) (explaining that a receiver is distinguishable from a bankruptcy trustee because the
trustee's rights are governed by the Bankruptcy Code); see also Uecker v. Wells Fargo Capital Fin.,
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claim arises from a statutory grant of the cause of action by the
Bankruptcy Code, the problem of imputation to the trustee does not arise
because the trustee does not act as a successor to the debtor and is,
therefore, not subject to any restrictions on the debtor's rights.234
Therefore, for example, if the trustee sues a party for the return of a
fraudulent transfer made by the officer, the trustee's suit is based on
either § 544(b)235 or § 548236 of the Bankruptcy Code, which do not
derive from any right that the debtor had, but confer the cause of action
on the trustee directly.2 37 However, a suit to recover a fraudulent transfer
is only available to recover property fraudulently conveyed by the
officer of the debtor. 238 The trustee has no cause of action, independent
of succession to the debtor's rights, to hold accountable in damages a
person (such as an errant accountant or lawyer) who participated in or
failed to prevent the illegal action. 2 3 9 To pursue an action of this kind,
the trustee must base her claim on a breach of duty to the debtor, to
which the estate succeeded upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition.240
LLC (In re Mortg. Fund '08 LLC), 527 B.R. 351, 368 (N.D. Cal. 2015); (distinguishing a receiver
from a bankruptcy trustee in that the receiver is not subject to the strictures of § 541 of the
Bankruptcy Code); Williamson v. Stallone, 905 N.Y.S.2d 740, 750-53 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (noting that a
liquidating trustee appointed by the court under state law is distinguishable from a bankruptcy
trustee in that the liquidating trustee is treated as an innocent successor, while a bankruptcy trustee
who asserts a claim derived from the debtor is merely a successor to the debtor, subject to any
defenses that could be raised against the debtor).
234. Williamson, 905 N.Y.S.2d at 751.
235. The Bankruptcy Code grants to the trustee the right to avoid any pre-bankruptcy transfer
by the debtor that could have been avoided by an unsecured creditor outside of bankruptcy under
state law. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (2012).
236. Section 548 grants to the trustee the power to avoid a pre-bankruptcy fraudulent transfer
by the debtor if the transfer satisfies the requirements set out in the section. 11 U.S.C. § 548.
237. McNamara v. PFS (In re Pers. & Bus. Ins. Agency), 334 F.3d 239, 241 (3d Cir. 2003)
(finding that because § 548 does not have the limitations of § 541, there is no reason not to seek the
more equitable result by refusing to impute the agent's wrongdoing to the trustee); Sec. Inv'r Prot.
Corp. v. Bernard Madoff lnv. Sec. LLC (In re Madoff), 531 B.R. 439, 449-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)
(finding that the in pari delicto rule does not bar a trustee's claim to avoid transfers); C&S
Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. DeLano Retail Partners, LLC, No. 11-37711-B-7, 2014 LEXIS 4258
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2014) (noting that while the trustee stands in the debtor's shoes under
§ 541, the trustee's suit under § 548 is bestowed on the trustee by statute and is not subject to the in
pari delicto defense); Jurista v. Amerinox Processing, Inc., 492 B.R. 707, 739 (D.N.J. 2013) (noting
that unlike § 541, the trustee does not stand in the shoes of the debtor in seeking to avoid a
fraudulent transfer under § 548).
238. In re Madoff, 531 B.R. at 449-50.
239. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 1991).
240. In a rare case, the trustee's suit against a collaborator in an officer's fraud might derive,
not from the debtor's rights, but from another source. See, e.g., Kirschner v. Wachovia Capital
Mkts. (In re Le-Nature's, Inc.), No. 8-1518, 2012 WL 363981, at *5-6 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2012). In
In re Le-Nature's Inc., the debtor corporation was placed in the control of a court-appointed
custodian shortly before its bankruptcy. The corrupt management team had been removed, so that
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The trustee's succession to that right is governed by § 541(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code.2 4
Section 541(a) creates an estate upon the commencement of a
bankruptcy case, to which passes "all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." 24 2 in essence,
whatever property interests the debtor corporation held at the
commencement of the case become property of the estate, including any
cause of action against a person who collaborated in or enabled the
illegal act of its officer or who aided and abetted the officer's breach of
fiduciary duty to the corporation. 2 43 The property rights the debtor has at
the commencement of the case are determined by the law of the
jurisdiction that governs that property 2" and are subject to any
when the bankruptcy was filed, the trustee stepped into the shoes of the custodian, not the debtor,
and the officers' wrongdoing was therefore not imputed to the trustee. Id
241. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2012).
242. Id.
243. All courts that have considered this question, except for the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, have held that the right to claim against a wrongdoer who collaborated in the officer's
illegal act is a right of the debtor, which becomes property of the estate. In re 1031 Tax Grp., LLC,
420 B.R. at 197 (noting that the "First, Third, Fifth, Eight, and Eleventh Circuits do not follow the
Second Circuit's approach"). However, the Second Circuit has taken the position that this claim
belongs to the creditors, and not the estate, so that the trustee has no standing to sue. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 944 F.2d at 120. This approach is known as the "Wagoner Rule" because it
was articulated in Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner. Id. Only the Second Circuit and
courts within that circuit have considered themselves bound by this approach. See, e.g., Picard v.
JPMorgan Chase & Co. (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC), 721 F.3d 54, 63 (2d Cir. 2013); In
re 1031 Tax Grp., LLC, 420 B.R. at 196-98. Other courts reject the Wagoner Rule and have held
that the bar to the trustee's claim is not a matter of standing at all. The trustee does have standing to
sue, but is subject to the in pari delicto defense. Nisselson v. Lernout, 469 F.3d 143, 150-51 (1st
Cir. 2006); Zazzali v. Hirschler Fleischer, 482 B.R. 495, 510 (D. Del. 2012); see also Gregg, supra
note 206, at 8-11; Jeffrey Davis, Ending the Nonsense: The In Pari Delicto DoctrineHas Nothing to
Do With What Is Property, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEVS. J. 519, 522-33 (2005). Some courts have
stated that the Wagoner Rule is essentially the same as the in pari delicto rule, and is to the same
effect. Cobalt Multifamily Inv'rs I, LLC v. Arden, 46 F. Supp. 3d 357, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting
that the Wagoner Rule is "essentially an application of the in pari delicto rule"); In re 1031 Tax
Grp., LLC, 420 B.R. at 197-98 (noting the result is the same, whether the Wagoner Rule or the in
pari delicto rule is applied-the trustee is denied recovery against the party that collaborated in or
enabled the criminal actions of the officer). However, the rules are not necessarily equivalent
because the lack of standing is an absolute bar, while the in pari delicto defense could fail if the
court decides that the balance of the factors set out in Part III calls for denial of the defense. Id. at
198; see supra Part II.

244. It is crucial to determine if, under the law of the jurisdiction, the cause of action asserted
by the trustee is in fact a right of the debtor. In McLemore v. Regions Bank, the court found
that the trustee's suit against a bank that aided and abetted a corporate officer's theft from employee
benefit plans did not derive from the debtor's rights and was not property of the estate. Because the
debtor was a fiduciary with regard to the plans, the cause of action to which the trustee succeeded
was the debtor's cause of action to recover on behalf of the beneficiaries. 682 F.3d 414, 420-22 (6th
Cir. 2012).
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restrictions, qualifications, or third-party rights recognized by that law,
including the in pari delicto defense.245 Courts have quite consistently
taken this position and have held that the trustee is subject to the in pari
delicto defense where the trustee's claim is grounded in a cause of action
possessed by the debtor and succeeded to by the estate under § 541.246
This same principle has been applied to a suit by a creditors'
committee,2 47 by a liquidation trustee (who is appointed to liquidate the
estate),2 48 and by an assignee of the claim from the estate. 249 The only
restriction on this rule is that it does not apply if the defendant was an
insider of the debtor.2 50
VI.

CONCLUSION: AVOIDING THE PERVERSITY OF ALLOWING THE
INPARIDELICTO DEFENSE TO DEFEAT THE INTERESTS
OF INNOCENT VICTIMS

The stark difference between the treatment of a receiver and of the
trustee as a successor to the debtor under § 541 may be justified as a

&

245. Calvert v. Bongards Creameries (In re Schauer), 835 F.2d 1222, 1225 (8th Cir. 1987).
246. Grayson Consulting, Inc. v. Wachovia Sec., LLP (In re Derivium Capital LLC), 716 F.3d
355, 367 (4th Cir. 2013); Peterson v. McGladrey & Pullen, LLP, 676 F.3d 594, 598-99 (7th Cir.
2012) (noting that the trustee's suit against an auditor for failing to prevent a Ponzi scheme derives
from the debtor's rights under § 541, so the trustee is subject to the in pari delicto defense);
Nisselson v. Lernout, 469 F.3d 143, 153 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting that the trustee acquires only those
rights that the debtor had at the time of the bankruptcy petition, and there is no innocent successor
exception); Uecker v. Wells Fargo Capital Fin., LLC (In re Mortg. Fund '08 LLC), 527 B.R. 351,
367-68 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Zazzali v. Eide Bailly, LLP, No. 1:12-CV-349-S, 2013 WL 6045978, at
*21-22 (D. Idaho Nov. 14, 2013) (explaining a trustee is distinguished from a receiver because the
trustee's right is that of successor to the debtor under § 541); Kohut v. Metzler Loricchio Seera
Co., P.C. (In re Munivest Servs., LLC), 500 B.R. 487, 494-99 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (noting that the
great weight of authority is that § 541 places the trustee in no better position than the debtor
occupied, and subject to all defenses available against the debtor).
247. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 354-58 (3d
Cir. 2001) (finding that a creditors' committee is subject to the same defenses that could have been
asserted against the debtor because the committee stands in the shoes of the debtor to which the
officer's illegal action was imputed).
248. Zazzali, 2013 WL 6045978, at *21 (explaining that a litigation trustee, like a bankruptcy
trustee, steps into the shoes of the debtor under § 541 and is subject to any defense that could have
been raised against the debtor, including the in pari delicto defense).
249. In re Derivium CapitalLLC, 716 F.3d at 367.
250. Hosking v. TPG Capital Mgmt., L.P. (In re Hellas Telecomm. (Lux.) II SCA), 524 B.R.
488, 532-33 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding that the in pari delicto rule does not apply if the defendant's
control and domination of the debtor rendered them insiders, whether they are shareholders,
corporate officials, or third-party professionals); OHC Liquidation Tr. v. Credit Suisse First Boston
(In re Oakwood Homes Corp.), 389 B.R. 357, 365-66 (D. Del. 2008) (noting that the in pari delicto
defense is not available to an insider of the debtor corporation, including not only its officers or
owners, but also any person that is so closely associated with the debtor that it was able to dominate
or control it).
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matter of statutory interpretation, but does not make sense as a matter of
policy or rationality. In both situations, the purpose of the suit is to
increase the value of the estate to the ultimate benefit of creditorsinnocent parties who were not implicated in the illegal actions.25 1 Some
courts recognize this but consider themselves bound by the plain
meaning of § 541.252 Arguments that the legislative history of § 541
shows that Congress did not intend defenses that are purely personal
against the debtor, such as the in pari delicto defense, to be effective
against the estate 253 have not persuaded courts. 25 4
A more persuasive basis for challenging the courts' approach to
§ 541 is that it is completely at odds with the policies and goals of both
251.

Some courts have expressed concern that the recovery by the trustee might not benefit

only innocent parties. Nisselson, 469 F.3d at 157-58. In some cases, it is possible that a benefit may
also be conferred on the officers who were implicated in the illegal act. For example, recovery by
the estate could reduce the officer's own liability to creditors. If the officer has equity in the
corporation, it is conceivable that recovery could result in some value going to stockholders, but in
most cases this does not happen because equity interests are wiped out in the bankruptcy. In
Nisselson, the court expressed concern that it can be difficult to separate the interests of innocent

and culpable parties, and so the court considered it best not to allow the estate to recover and to
leave innocent parties to sue on their own behalf. Id However, even if it is difficult to determine if
the guilty officer would benefit, this is a factual question capable of determination. The solution of
allowing innocent parties to assert a direct cause of action is only an alternative where the innocent
parties have a direct cause of action. However, they do not necessarily have such an independent
cause of action, as would be true, in say, a malpractice case against an accountant or lawyer who

failed to prevent an officer's illegal conduct.
252. In re Derivium CapitalLLC, 716 F.3d at 367 (finding that although the reasoning in cases
involving receivers is appealing, it does not comport with the plain meaning of § 541); Zazzali,
2013 WL 6045978, at *21 n. 18 (finding that if it is unfair to apply the in pari delicto defense to a
trustee who represents innocent creditors, this must be corrected by Congress, not the courts); Kohut
v. Metzler Loricchio Seera & Co., P.C. (In re Munivest Servs., LLC), 500 B.R. 487 495-99 (E.D.
Mich. 2013) (explaining that although there are attractive policy rationales in favor of allowing the
trustee to recover, they cannot overcome the rule of
paridelicto rule).

253.

§ 541

that makes the trustee subject to the in

William McGrane, The Erroneous Application of the Defense of In Pari Delicto to

Bankruptcy Trustees, 29 CAL. BANKR. J. 275, 280-81 (2007); Tanuir Alam, Fraudulent Advisors
Exploit Confusion in the Bankruptcy Code: How In Pari Delicto Has Been Perverted to Prevent
Recovery for Innocent Creditors, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J. 305 (2003); Davis, supra note 243, at 521-22,

538-40 (arguing that courts have misread the legislative history of § 541 by ignoring the
qualification relating to defenses personal against the debtor).
254. No court has accepted this argument. In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of
PSA, Inc., the court said that it need not resort to the legislative history of § 541 because the section
is unambiguous, and its plain meaning is that the trustee stands in the debtor's shoes. 437 F.3d 1145,
1150 (11th Cir. 2006). The court went on to say that even if the legislative history were to be
considered, it does not support the view that § 541 was not intended to allow against the trustee
defenses that were personal against the debtor and that, in any event, the in pari delicto defense does
not qualify as a defense personal against the debtor. Id In Uecker v. Wells Fargo CapitalFinancial,
LLC (In re Mortg. Fund '08 LLC), the court found that the legislative history of § 541 supports the
conclusion that the section was not intended to expand the estate's rights beyond those held by the
debtor at the commencement of the case. 527 B.R. 351, 367-68 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
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the in pari delicto rule and bankruptcy law. It is a fundamental goal of
bankruptcy law to enhance the value of the estate to the benefit of
creditors.25 5 The aims of the in pari delicto rule are to deter wrongdoing
and to prevent a wrongdoer from using the courts to gain relief for loss
or damages suffered as a result of the illegal transaction.25 6 By applying
the in pari delicto rule to a trustee, the court does nothing to deter
wrongdoing but allows the person that aided or overlooked the officer's
illegal conduct to escape accountability, creates no disincentive to other
officers to behave more honestly in future cases, does not serve justice,
and does not favor the public good.257 Concern about benefitting the
wrongdoing officer is misplaced in most cases, and even where this is a
realistic concern, it can be dealt with in the individual case and does not
justify a blanket bar on relief.
Because courts have not been willing to interpret § 541 to exclude
defenses personal to the debtor, it may seem that there is not much to be
done, apart from making the argument to those courts that have not yet
passed on the question or following the unlikely path of trying to get
Congress to amend the section. However, there is a simpler way to avoid
the unfairness of allowing the in paridelicto defense against the trustee:
courts could avoid barring trustee relief by exercising the considerable
discretion that they have in deciding the question of imputation to the
debtor itself and in the application of the in pari delicto rule. A court that
recognizes that neither the goals of the in pari delicto rule nor
bankruptcy policy are served by precluding the trustee's suit might avoid
that result by a narrower rule of imputation that looks at real and
substantial benefit to the corporation.
Even if the court decides to impute the officer's action to the
corporation, there must still be a determination of whether the
corporation bears equal or greater guilt than the defendant, and the court
has broad authority for achieving a principled and policy-based
resolution of that issue through the discretionary balancing described in
Part 111.258 At every stage of the in pari delicto analysis, the court has a
significant amount of discretion-it may make judgments on the
questions of whether the breach of the law is sufficient to merit refusal

255. Davis, supra note 243, at 521.
256. See supra Part II.
257. McLemore v. Regions Bank, 682 F.3d 414, 422 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that the in pari
delicto doctrine is an equitable doctrine and should be limited to the equitable purposes that it is
meant to serve-preventing courts from wasting judicial resources in mediating disputes between
wrongdoers and deterring illegality).
258. See supra Part III.
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of relief, whether the plaintiff bears at least equal responsibility for the
illegality, whether a claim for restitution should be looked upon more
favorably than a claim for enforcement, and whether public policy and
the equities of the situation demand the refusal of relief This discretion
is greatest where there is little or no statutory mandate for granting or
refusing relief, but it still exists to some degree even where the violation
of the law offends a statute that does not express the impact of the
violation on the private rights of the parties to the transaction. By
following a coherent, goal-oriented approach to application of the rule,
courts are able to exercise discretion in a manner that is most likely to
curtail randomness and to provide a more certain, predictable, and fair
basis for handling claims arising out of illegal transactions.
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